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THE BRUSSELS EFFECT 
Anu Bradford 
ABSTRACT—This Article examines the unprecedented and deeply 
underestimated global power that the European Union is exercising through 
its legal institutions and standards, and how it successfully exports that 
influence to the rest of the world. Without the need to use international 
institutions or seek other nations’ cooperation, the EU has a strong and 
growing ability to promulgate regulations that become entrenched in the 
legal frameworks of developed and developing markets alike, leading to a 
notable “Europeanization” of many important aspects of global commerce. 
The Article identifies the precise conditions for and the specific mechanism 
through which this externalization of EU’s standards unfolds. Enhanced 
understanding of these conditions and this mechanism helps explain why 
the EU is currently the only jurisdiction that can wield unilateral influence 
across a number of areas of law—ranging from antitrust and privacy to 
health and environmental regulation—and why the markets, other states, 
and international institutions can do little to constrain Europe’s global 
regulatory power. 
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It is common to hear Europe described today as the power of the past. 
Europe is perceived to be weak militarily.1 Its relative economic power is 
declining as Asia’s is rising. Its common currency may be on the verge of 
disintegrating. On the world stage, the European Union is thought to be 
waning into irrelevance due to its inability to speak with one voice.2 Given 
its seemingly declining power status and inability to get its way alone, the 
 
1  See Charles Grant, How to Make Europe’s Military Work, FT.COM (Aug. 16, 2009, 6:53 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f32e0e98-8a8b-11de-ad08-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Bwh5garO. 
2  See Philip Stephens, Europe’s Leaders Recoil from Unity, FT.COM (Dec. 2, 2010, 10:44 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1301e064-fe53-11df-abac-00144feab49a.html#axzz29D0EJCei; see also 
Charles Grant, The Unraveling of the EU, PROSPECT, July 2009, at 48, 48 (“Russian, Chinese[, and] 
Indian policy-makers . . . view it as a trade bloc that had pretensions to power but has failed to realise 
them because it is divided and badly organised.”). 
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EU is perceived as needing to retreat to weak multilateralism and 
international institutions. 
Contrary to this prevalent perception, this Article highlights a deeply 
underestimated aspect of European power that the discussion on 
globalization and power politics overlooks: Europe’s unilateral power to 
regulate global markets. The European Union sets the global rules across a 
range of areas, such as food, chemicals, competition, and the protection of 
privacy. EU regulations have a tangible impact on the everyday lives of 
citizens around the world.3 Few Americans are aware that EU regulations 
determine the makeup they apply in the morning,4 the cereal they eat for 
breakfast,5 the software they use on their computer,6 and the privacy settings 
they adjust on their Facebook page.7 And that’s just before 8:30 AM. The 
EU also sets the rules governing the interoffice phone directory they use to 
call a coworker.8 EU regulations dictate what kind of air conditioners 
Americans use to cool their homes9 and why their children no longer find 
soft plastic toys in their McDonald’s Happy Meals.10 This phenomenon—
the “Brussels Effect”—is the focus of this Article. 
This Article explains how and why the rules and regulations 
originating from Brussels have penetrated many aspects of economic life 
within and outside of Europe through the process of “unilateral regulatory 
globalization.” Unilateral regulatory globalization occurs when a single 
state is able to externalize its laws and regulations outside its borders 
through market mechanisms, resulting in the globalization of standards. 
 
3  See, e.g., David Scheer, For Your Eyes Only—Europe’s New High-Tech Role: Playing Privacy 
Cop to the World, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2003, at A1; Brandon Mitchener, Standard Bearers: 
Increasingly, Rules of Global Economy Are Set in Brussels, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2002, at A1; Editorial, 
Regulatory Imperialism, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1193347205
39572002.html; see Case COMP/M.5984, Intel/McAfee, EUR-Lex 32011M5984 (Jan. 26, 2011). 
4  See Council Directive 76/768/EEC, of 27 July 1976 on the Approximation of the Laws of the 
Member States Relating to Cosmetic Products, 1976 O.J. (L 262) 169. 
5  See Regulation (EC) 1829/2003, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 
2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1. 
6  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 101 & 
102, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 88–89 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
7  See Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive]. 
8  See id. 
9  See Directive 2002/95/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 on 
the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment, 
2003 O.J. (L 37) 19 [hereinafter Directive 2002/95/EC]. 
10  See Regulation (EC) 1907/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 
2006 Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), 
Establishing a European Chemicals Agency, 2007 O.J. (L 136) 3 [hereinafter REACH]; Directive 
2005/84/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2005 Relating to 
Restrictions on the Marketing and Use of Certain Dangerous Substances and Preparations (Phthalates in 
Toys and Childcare Articles), 2005 O.J. (L 344) 40. 
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This process can be distinguished from political globalization of regulatory 
standards where regulatory convergence results from negotiated standards, 
including international treaties or agreements among states or regulatory 
authorities.11 It is also different from unilateral coercion, where one 
jurisdiction imposes its rules on others through threats or sanctions.12 
Unilateral regulatory globalization is a development where a law of one 
jurisdiction migrates into another in the absence of the former actively 
imposing it or the latter willingly adopting it. 
Critics of globalization have claimed that trade liberalization 
undermines domestic regulation.13 Extensive literature has emerged 
regarding the “race to the bottom” phenomenon—the idea that countries 
lower their regulatory standards in order to improve their relative 
competitive position in the global economy.14 Recently, many of the 
assumptions driving this influential literature have been discredited.15 For 
example, fears of businesses relocating to pollution havens or capital flights 
following higher levels of corporate taxation have not materialized in large 
numbers. Indeed, scholars have shown that international trade has 
frequently triggered a “race to the top,” whereby domestic regulations have 
become more stringent as the global economy has become more 
integrated.16 Still, the race to the bottom paradigm remains influential, 
shaping the debates among scholars and policy makers alike. 
 
11  See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 
11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162. 
12  The United States, for example, has imposed sanctions to compel other countries to adopt stricter 
rules in areas such as antiterrorism and drug enforcement. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 11 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing foreign-policy use of economic 
sanctions generally). 
13  See, e.g., Ralph Nader, Preface to LORI WALLACH & MICHELLE SFORZA, WHOSE TRADE 
ORGANIZATION?: CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY, at ix, xi (1999). 
14  Id.; see also ALAN TONELSON, THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM: WHY A WORLDWIDE WORKER 
SURPLUS AND UNCONTROLLED FREE TRADE ARE SINKING AMERICAN LIVING STANDARDS 14–15 
(2002) (“[G]overnments and workers all over the world have been forced into a competition for 
productive investment that is most often won by scrapping or forswearing most of the laws and 
regulations that complicate business operations and lower short-term profits, but that also ensure that 
living wages are paid, that workplaces are safe, and that pollution is controlled.”). For a general 
discussion of this dynamic, see DALE D. MURPHY, THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION: 
CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2004), in particular Parts I, II, and V. 
15  See David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan, Introduction to DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE: 
HOW GLOBALIZATION AFFECTS NATIONAL REGULATORY POLICIES 4–5 (David Vogel & Robert A. 
Kagan eds., 2004) [hereinafter DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE]. 
16  See Debora L. Spar & David B. Yoffie, A Race to the Bottom or Governance from the Top?, in 
COPING WITH GLOBALIZATION 31, 31–51 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart eds., 2000); David Vogel, 
Trading Up and Governing Across: Transnational Governance and Environmental Protection, 4 J. EUR. 
PUB. POL’Y 556, 563 (1997); Vogel & Kagan, supra note 15, at 2–8; see also ELIZABETH R. DESOMBRE, 
FLAGGING STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY, AND LABOR REGULATIONS 
AT SEA (2006) (seeking to identify conditions under which a race to the top, race to the bottom, and a 
race to the middle take place). 
107:1 (2012) The Brussels Effect 
 5
The discussion on global regulatory races mirrors the debates on 
regulatory outcomes in federal systems. The “Delaware Effect” has been 
used to explain devolution in standards within the United States: since 
corporations can be incorporated in any state irrespective of where they do 
business, all states have an incentive to relax their chartering requirements 
in order to attract tax revenues that corporations bring to the state. Delaware 
has been the winner of this race by virtue of being the most attractive place 
to incorporate, either from the perspective of management, shareholders, or 
both.17 The “California Effect” captures an opposite phenomenon: due to its 
large market and preference for strict consumer and environmental 
regulations, California is, at times, effectively able to set the regulatory 
standards for all the other states.18 Businesses willing to export to California 
must meet its standards, and the prospect of scale economies from uniform 
production standards gives these firms an incentive to apply this same 
(strict) standard to their entire production.19 
This Article explores the dynamics of the California Effect in a global 
context.20 It focuses on the conditions under which a single country can 
externalize its regulations on other countries. It argues that the following 
conditions are necessary for a jurisdiction to dictate rules for global 
commerce: the jurisdiction must have a large domestic market, significant 
regulatory capacity, and the propensity to enforce strict rules over inelastic 
targets (e.g., consumer markets) as opposed to elastic targets (e.g., capital). 
In addition, unilateral regulatory globalization presumes that the benefits of 
adopting a uniform global standard exceed the benefits of adhering to 
multiple, including laxer, regulatory standards. This is the case in particular 
when the firms’ conduct or production is nondivisible, meaning that it is not 
legally or technically feasible, or economically viable, for the firm to 
maintain different standards in different markets. 
Unpacking the determinants of unilateral regulatory globalization 
explains why the EU has become the predominant regulator of global 
commerce, and why the EU can successfully export certain norms and not 
others. The EU has the world’s largest internal market, supported by strong 
regulatory institutions. Trading with the EU requires foreign companies to 
adjust their conduct or production to EU standards—which often represent 
the most stringent standards—or else forgo the EU market entirely. Rarely 
 
17  See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New 
Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 761–63 (1987). 
18  See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY (1995). 
19  See Vogel & Kagan, supra note 15, at 9. For an example of a California regulation that prompted 
firms to adopt the California standard and alter their production nationwide, see Safe Drinking Water 
and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5–.13 (West 2006) (on 
labeling requirements in the presence of carcinogenic or reproductive toxins in consumer products or 
food). 
20  See Vogel, supra note 16, at 562. 
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is the latter an option. In addition, companies cannot undermine EU rules 
by moving regulatory targets to another jurisdiction because the EU 
primarily regulates inelastic consumer markets as opposed to more elastic 
capital markets. While the EU regulates only its internal market, 
multinational corporations often have an incentive to standardize their 
production globally and adhere to a single rule. This converts the EU rule 
into a global rule—the “de facto Brussels Effect.” Finally, after these 
export-oriented firms have adjusted their business practices to meet the 
EU’s strict standards, they often have the incentive to lobby their domestic 
governments to adopt these same standards in an effort to level the playing 
field against their domestic, non-export-oriented competitors—the “de jure 
Brussels Effect.”21 
This Article also seeks to explain what prompts the EU to exercise this 
authority and what implications this regulatory leverage has on other 
countries, including the United States. It concludes that the EU’s external 
regulatory agenda is primarily, even if not exclusively, driven by a set of 
entrenched domestic policy preferences and the EU’s efforts to create an 
internal market that reflects those preferences. The EU’s external regulatory 
agenda has thus emerged largely as an inadvertent by-product of that 
internal goal rather than as a result of some conscious effort to engage in 
“regulatory imperialism.” 
After acknowledging the many manifestations and benefits of the EU’s 
global regulatory authority, this Article moves on to discuss the limits of the 
Brussels Effect and the extent to which other countries or international 
institutions are able to counterbalance the EU’s regulatory hegemony. 
Markets have a limited ability to act as a constraint on the 
“Europeanization” of global economic activity given that the EU primarily 
regulates policy areas of low elasticity, including consumer markets. Other 
states are also often powerless. Countries whose regulatory preferences are 
overridden by the EU’s standards gain nothing by entering into a regulatory 
race with the EU—outpacing the EU will only leave them with even higher, 
and hence less desirable, regulatory standards. Further, international 
institutions have only an imperfect ability to dampen the EU’s regulatory 
ambitions since issues such as privacy and antitrust do not fall within the 
purview of the WTO or other international institutions.22 This Article 
therefore argues that the greatest check on the EU’s regulatory powers 
comes from within the EU itself. As the EU’s powers grow, internal 
divisions within the EU will increase. Thus, in the end, the boundaries of 
 
21  See generally VOGEL, supra note 18 (discussing a similar phenomenon in federal systems). 
22  See, e.g., Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/comp_e.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2012); see also Anu Bradford, When 
the WTO Works, and How It Fails, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010) (discussing the WTO’s failure to 
facilitate global cooperation on antitrust issues). 
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the EU’s regulatory reach will be defined by the EU’s own evolving 
conception of the limits of its regulatory authority. 
This Article contributes to the scholarship on international regulatory 
convergence.23 It also engages directly with the literature on the direction of 
possible regulatory races, such as whether the Delaware Effect or the 
California Effect is more pervasive in explaining regulatory outcomes 
globally.24 While the Article builds on the existing theory of the California 
Effect, it goes beyond it in two critical ways. First, it seeks to outline the 
precise conditions that allow an upward regulatory convergence to take 
place. While the California Effect is recognized as a phenomenon,25 existing 
scholarship has not explained its actual scope beyond anecdotes and 
individual examples. Second, it uncovers and explains a perhaps most 
significant example of the California Effect—its global occurrence—that 
has been undertheorized and underestimated as an empirical phenomenon. 
The existing scholarship on the California Effect has recognized the 
importance of market size and scale economies as a source of a 
jurisdiction’s external regulatory clout. At the same time, it has failed to 
acknowledge factors such as regulatory capacity and inelasticity as key 
components of the theory, and it has overlooked criteria other than scale 
economies as factors that can prevent a company from producing different 
varieties for different markets. Thus, the discussion of the Brussels Effect 
provides a more nuanced theory of the conditions under which a single 
jurisdiction can exert regulatory influence outside its borders. Second, the 
global regulatory clout that the EU exercises via the Brussels Effect has 
been vastly underappreciated. Scholarship on international regulatory 
convergence has focused on a country’s market size as the best proxy for its 
external regulatory influence. This Article, however, shows that market 
power alone does not explain international regulatory outcomes. A more 
accurate and complete understanding of the conditions underlying the 
Brussels Effect explains why the EU, as opposed to any other large 
economy, can unilaterally supply global standards. 
In addition, this Article makes the following contributions. First, it 
shows that the Brussels Effect is more pervasive and widespread than thus 
far recognized. The current literature on upward regulatory races focuses 
almost exclusively on environmental regulation.26 Even there, scholars 
 
23  E.g., Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization, Harmonization, and Competition: The Different 
Pathways to Policy Convergence, 12 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 841, 841–59 (2005); Beth Simmons, The 
International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation, in DYNAMICS OF 
REGULATORY CHANGE, supra note 15, at 42, 50–52. 
24  See, e.g., Vogel & Kagan, supra note 15, at 6, 9. 
25  See VOGEL, supra note 18. 
26  See, e.g., Katharina Holzinger & Thomas Sommerer, ‘Race to the Bottom’ or ‘Race to 
Brussels’?: Environmental Competition in Europe, 49 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 315, 329 (2011) 
(concluding that empirical evidence demonstrates a “far-reaching upward trend in environmental 
regulation from the 1970s until today”). 
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claim that regulatory globalization through the California Effect is 
constrained to “only a highly limited subset of environmental laws”27 and 
largely excluded in the case of production (as opposed to product) 
standards28 or consumer protection.29 This view fails to capture the full 
impact of the phenomenon. 
Second, the existing literature focuses on the race to the top that takes 
place when a lax foreign regulator formally adopts the strict rule of the lead 
regulator.30 This attention to “de jure regulatory convergence” fails to 
account for an important phenomenon that takes place in the absence of 
formal changes to legal rules. In reality, this type of formal “trading up” 
often fails to occur. Instead, we typically see only a “de facto regulatory 
convergence” whereby much of global business is conducted under 
unilateral EU rules even when other states continue to maintain their own 
rules. This is true, for instance, with respect to U.S. antitrust laws, privacy 
laws, and rules on food safety. Unilateral regulatory globalization does not 
need to elicit a formal regulatory response from another nation—often there 
is no race to the top or de jure Brussels Effect. The EU law governs whether 
other countries follow suit or not. Seen in this light, the Brussels Effect is 
more about one jurisdiction’s ability to override others than it is about 
triggering an upward race. 
It is true that at times this de facto Brussels Effect is reinforced with a 
de jure Brussels Effect. This is the case when other countries’ legislators 
affirmatively adopt the EU’s strict standards. But even here, the path to 
regulatory convergence follows a sequence different from what we have 
become accustomed to in other contexts. Corporations’ de facto adjustment 
to the EU rules paves the way for legislators’ de jure implementation of 
these rules rather than the other way around. Thus, the implementation 
problem of the de jure Brussels Effect is solved from the outset. 
Third, the theory of unilateral regulatory globalization departs from 
existing scholarship on the relationship between regulatory convergence 
 
27  Vogel & Kagan, supra note 15, at 10. 
28  See Fritz W. Scharpf, Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European 
Welfare States, in GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 15, 28–29 (Gary Marks et al. eds., 1996); 
Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition 
Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 67–110 (1996) (discussing 
regulatory-regime exportation in the context of environmental protection). 
29  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory 
Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1359, 1361 (2003) (arguing that regulatory globalization does not 
take place in the area of consumer protection, where regulators are assumed to have complete autonomy 
to regulate their domestic markets). 
30  See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 518–19 (2000) 
(discussing both race to the bottom (RTB) and race to the top (RTT), and arguing that RTT is a result of 
countries adopting as “best practices” those that they consider to be in their interest); Simmons, supra 
note 23 (canvassing research focusing on conditions under which other regulators have the incentive to 
adjust); Vogel & Kagan, supra note 15, at 14 (focusing on de jure trading up as the foreign country 
switches its standards as a result of RTT). 
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and regulatory power. Daniel Drezner has argued that great-power 
consensus leads to regulatory convergence whereas great-power 
disagreement leads to regulatory divergence and the emergence of rival 
standards.31 Which rival standard trumps the other depends on the 
regulatory powers’ relative ability to seek allies supporting their respective 
regulatory preferences and reach a tipping point after which the rival states 
need to switch standards.32 In contrast to Drezner, this Article shows that de 
facto convergence can take place in the midst of a great-power 
disagreement. When the conditions for the Brussels Effect exist, rival 
standards between two equal powers fail to materialize. Instead, the 
outcome of the regulatory race is predetermined: the more stringent 
regulator prevails. 
Finally, prevailing theories on regulatory globalization explain the 
emergence of regulatory convergence as a result of cooperation or coercion. 
The Brussels Effect differs because it falls between the two. Beth Simmons, 
for instance, shows how in the case of capital adequacy requirements and 
accounting standards for public offerings, countries with lenient regulatory 
standards have an incentive to adopt other countries’ stricter standards in 
order to attract foreign capital.33 This amounts to a market-driven race to the 
top that is normatively desirable—the followers have a clear economic 
incentive to adopt the desirable rules that leave everyone better off. In 
contrast, unilateral regulatory globalization is rarely a process of voluntary 
harmonization: foreign corporations would often prefer another rule but 
find it rational to adjust nonetheless given the opportunity costs of not 
doing so. Yet the EU is not coercing others to adopt its rules either. Market 
forces are sufficient to create “involuntary incentives” to adjust to the rules 
of the strict regulator. In other words, unilateral regulatory globalization 
entails the dominant jurisdiction imposing an incentive to adjust, followed 
by reluctant emulation by market participants. Seen this way, unilateral 
regulatory globalization is produced through “go-it-alone power” by a 
dominant regulator.34 
In addition to advancing the literature on regulatory globalization, this 
Article makes a contribution to the literature on state power in international 
relations. While traditional tools of power have waned in importance—it is 
 
31  See Drezner, supra note 23, at 841. 
32  Id. at 850. 
33  See Simmons, supra note 23, at 49. 
34  See LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD: POWER POLITICS AND THE RISE OF SUPRANATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS (2000). Gruber contests the positive-sum models of international cooperation and explains 
why states join institutions that are not Pareto-improving for them. When states that win from some 
cooperative arrangement are in a position to proceed even without the support of the losing states, losing 
states’ interest calculation changes and they join the new institution even though they would have 
preferred that such an institution was never set up in the first place. A movement or change that is 
Pareto-improving is one that makes at least one participant better off without making any participant 
worse off. 
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increasingly difficult to exert influence through raw military power or rely 
on economic sanctions or conditional incentives35—regulatory power that 
the EU possesses is more durable, more deployable, and less easily 
undermined by others. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the conditions under 
which the Brussels Effect takes place. Part II illustrates the Brussels Effect 
through examples. Part III discusses the reasons that cause the EU to 
externalize its regulations. Part IV explains when and why the EU pursues 
political (cooperative) regulatory globalization instead of market-driven 
(unilateral) regulatory globalization. Part V discusses the limits of the 
Brussels Effect. The Conclusion focuses on the implications of the EU’s 
global regulatory role within and beyond the EU. The purpose of this 
discussion is descriptive. This Article does not discuss whether strict 
regulatory standards are efficient or desirable. Instead, it provides an 
account for why and how trade liberalization can lead to stringent standards, 
why this follows a process of unilateral regulatory globalization, and why 
today these global standards are set predominantly by the EU. 
I. CONDITIONS FOR UNILATERAL REGULATORY GLOBALIZATION 
This Part lays the theoretical foundation for the Brussels Effect. It 
identifies the conditions for and the mechanism through which the 
externalization of one state’s standards unfolds. It also explains why the EU 
is currently the predominant regulatory regime that can wield unilateral 
influence across a number of areas of law. 
Existing literature on regulatory globalization focuses on the country’s 
market size as a proxy for its ability to exercise regulatory authority over 
foreign entities.36 Yet a more careful examination of unilateral regulatory 
authority suggests that market power alone does not determine whether any 
given country’s standards can be globalized. The state must also have the 
regulatory capacity and the regulatory propensity to exercise global 
regulatory authority. By “regulatory capacity,” I refer to institutional 
structures that are capable of producing and enforcing regulations 
effectively. By “regulatory propensity,” I refer to prevailing domestic 
preferences for strict regulatory standards and the predisposition to regulate 
inelastic targets. Only strict standards regulating targets that cannot move 
ensure that a country’s regulations will override alternative regulatory 
 
35  See Leslie H. Gelb, GDP Now Matters More than Force: A U.S. Foreign Policy for the Age of 
Economic Power, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2010, at 35. 
36  See, e.g., Drezner, supra note 23, at 847 (“[A] . . . reasonable conjecture would be to say that the 
public good benefits from regulatory coordination depend upon the size of the newly opened market.”); 
see also, e.g., David A. Wirth, The EU’s New Impact on U.S. Environmental Regulation, 31 FLETCHER 
F. WORLD AFF. 91, 96 (2007) (“If [a] jurisdiction’s market share is sufficiently large, [its] regulatory 
requirements can affect an even larger area, including those under the control of other sovereign 
authorities.”). 
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standards and make other jurisdictions’ regulatory authority obsolete 
without being punished by markets or constrained by other jurisdictions’ 
regulatory responses. Finally, EU standards become global standards only 
when the benefits of adhering to a single global standard are greater than 
the benefits of taking advantage of laxer standards in lenient jurisdictions—
in other words, when targets’ conduct or production is nondivisible. 
A. Market Power 
In the global economy, power is correlated with the relative size of any 
given country’s internal market.37 To secure access to important markets, 
producers gravitate toward adopting the standards prevailing in those 
markets.38 The larger the market of the (strict) importing country relative to 
the (lenient) market of the exporter country, the more likely the Brussels 
Effect will occur.39 More accurately, the greater the ratio of exports to the 
(strict) jurisdiction relative to sales in the (lenient) home or third-country 
markets, the more likely the Brussels Effect will occur. The better the 
exporter’s ability to divert trade to third markets or increase demand on its 
home market, the less dependent it is on access to the market of the strict 
jurisdiction. 
Focusing on large domestic markets alone, several states could qualify 
as potential global standard-setters. The EU is the largest economy in the 
world with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of nearly $16 trillion.40 It 
consists of a single market with 500 million consumers.41 The EU has a 
quarter of the countries’ combined Gross National Product (GNP) 
worldwide and is the largest importer of goods and services.42 The EU’s 
internal market is also constantly growing as new countries are joining the 
EU. Of course, the United States, China, and Japan also possess domestic 
markets large enough to use access to their markets as leverage. The United 
States has an economy of over $15 trillion, almost the same size as the EU, 
while China has an economy of $11 trillion and Japan has one of $4 
trillion.43 
 
37  See Drezner, supra note 23, at 843. 
38  See id. 
39  See Vogel & Kagan, supra note 15, at 13 (citing Sebastiaan Princen, The California Effect in the 
EC’s External Relations: A Comparison of the Leghold Trap and the Beef-Hormone Issues Between the 
EC and the US & Canada (June 2–5, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/
2367/). 
40  European Union, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ee.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). The GDP figure is based on purchasing power parity 
(PPP). 
41  See id. 
42  See WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 25 (2011), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report11_e.pdf. 
43  United States, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012); China, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/
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When assessing the value of market access, foreign corporations also 
consider the adjustment costs that are necessary to enter the market. A 
foreign producer will have an incentive to comply with the importing 
jurisdiction’s strict standard when the benefits of market access outweigh 
the adjustment costs. The larger the strict importing market and the lower 
the adjustment costs relative to the benefits of market access, the more 
likely that adjustment will take place.44 In the case of consumer goods, the 
benefits of market access are determined by the number and affluence of 
potential consumers of that product as well as by the opportunity costs of 
forgoing those consumers. These opportunity costs are particularly high 
when demand in the corporation’s home market or in alternative third 
markets is limited. The adjustment costs can consist of initial setup costs 
and recurring compliance costs. They vary with the significance of cross-
border differentials that determine the degree of adjustment and various 
other compliance costs associated with market access, including licenses or 
approval processes. 
With the world’s largest consumer market consisting of a high 
proportion of affluent consumers, a significant number of producers are 
dependent on their ability to supply the EU market.45 They may be able to 
divert part of their exports elsewhere, but few are in a position to abandon 
the EU market altogether and recoup the forgone revenue in other markets. 
The distinctly high value of market access to the EU explains why many 
producers are prepared to incur even significant adjustment costs to retain 
their ability to trade with the EU. 
B. Regulatory Capacity 
Large market size alone does not explain a state’s ability to project its 
regulatory preferences on others. Being a regulatory power is a conscious 
choice pursued by a state rather than something that is inherent in its market 
size. Not all states with large markets become sources of global standards. 
The state must also have the regulatory capacity to translate its market 
power into tangible regulatory influence.46 Without regulatory expertise and 
resources to enforce its rules, a country cannot effectively exert authority 
 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012); Japan, CIA WORLD 
FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html (last visited Nov. 
5, 2012). The GDP figures are PPP-based. 
44  See Alasdair R. Young, Political Transfer and “Trading Up”? Transatlantic Trade in 
Genetically Modified Food and U.S. Politics, 55 WORLD POL. 457, 459 (2003). 
45  The EU’s population exceeds 500 million, and its GDP per capita is approximately $34,000. 
European Union, supra note 40. The United States is relatively more affluent (GDP per capita of 
$48,100), but its consumer market is smaller (population of 313 million). United States, supra note 43. 
China, on the other hand, has a larger consumer market (population of 1.3 billion), but is relatively less 
affluent (GDP per capita of $8,400). China, supra note 43. 
46  See David Bach & Abraham L. Newman, The European Regulatory State and Global Public 
Policy: Micro-Institutions, Macro-Influence, 14 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 827, 831 (2007). 
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over market participants—within or outside of its jurisdiction. An important 
element of regulatory capacity is the authority to impose sanctions in case 
of noncompliance. Only jurisdictions with the capacity to impose 
significant costs on others by excluding noncomplying firms from their 
markets can force regulatory adjustment.47 
The degree to which a country has regulatory capacity sets important 
limits on a country’s ability to exert global regulatory authority. For 
instance, many Asian economies are growing at a staggering rate, but it will 
take time before their GDP growth translates into regulatory experience and 
institutional capacity to enforce their norms.48 Thus, acknowledging that 
sophisticated regulatory institutions are required to activate the power of 
sizable domestic markets, few jurisdictions outside the United States or the 
EU have the capacity to be regulators with global reach.49 
The U.S. administrative agencies’ capacity to promulgate and enforce 
rules in the United States is well understood. The rise of the regulatory state 
in the EU is more recent, yet the institutional developments that 
accompanied the creation of the single market have bestowed the EU with 
substantial regulatory capacity.50 The Council of the European Union 
(representing the executive branches of the member states), together with 
the European Parliament (representing the EU citizens), exercises 
legislative authority in the EU. The Council makes decisions by a simple or 
qualified majority vote or, depending on the subject matter, unanimously. 
The European Commission (representing the common EU interest) is the 
EU’s executive arm. The Commission enjoys substantial independent 
decisionmaking authority. It proposes legislation and ensures that the 
regulations and directives adopted by the Council and the Parliament are 
implemented in the member states. If an individual member state fails to 
 
47  See id. at 832. 
48  See Colin Kirkpatrick & David Parker, Infrastructure Regulation: Models for Developing Asia 
40–41 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst. Discussion Paper No. 6, 2004), available at http://www.adbi.org/files/
2004.05.06.dp006.infrastructure.asia.pdf (describing the difficulties developing countries face in 
implementing an effective regulatory regime, including an economy’s “institutional endowment”). For 
instance, China adopted a domestic antitrust law in 2008, vesting the authority to enforce the law among 
three different agencies. See Xiaoye Wang, Highlights of China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law, 
75 ANTITRUST L.J. 133, 145 (2008). Prior to 2008, China had no capacity to exercise regulatory power 
in antitrust matters. Still, even after enacting the law and creating an institutional structure to enforce the 
law, it will be a while before the regulatory clout of the new agencies will match that of the United 
States (which has been enforcing antitrust laws since 1890) and the EU (which has been enforcing 
antitrust laws since 1957). Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)); Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome) 
arts. 85, 86, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
49  See Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power, 
13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 906, 907–08 (2006). 
50  See Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, W. EUR. POL., July 1994, 
at 77, 83–101. 
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implement certain regulations, the Commission has the authority to 
challenge the noncomplying member state before the European courts.51 
Vesting the EU institutions with the expertise, powers, and resources to 
guard the common market and to guarantee the rights and responsibilities 
embedded in European treaties has been integral to the entire European 
project. The EU’s regulatory capacity has also gradually expanded over the 
years as a larger set of regulations have become subject to qualified 
majority voting as opposed to unanimity and as the European Parliament—
known for its pro-regulation stance—has gained influence in the EU’s 
legislative process.52 The EU institutions have acquired these increased 
powers as a result of the need to further integrate the common market and 
pursue joint gains from deeper integration. 
The EU’s regulatory capacity varies across different policy areas. It is 
most extensive in areas like trade and competition policy, which are central 
to establishing and strengthening the single market. It is most limited in 
sensitive areas such as common foreign and security policy, where the 
individual member states have retained substantial authority. Naturally, the 
EU’s global regulatory power is limited to policy areas in which the 
member states have ceded either exclusive or shared regulatory competence 
to the EU.53 
C. Preference for Strict Rules 
Regulatory capacity must further be supplemented with the political 
will to deploy it. Thus, the jurisdiction must also have the propensity to 
promulgate strict regulatory standards. The domestic preference for strict 
regulation is more likely to be found in countries with high levels of 
income.54 Wealthier countries can better afford pursuing consumer 
protection at the expense of the profitability of their firms. This, together 
with the lack of regulatory capacity, explains why emerging markets are 
 
51  See MARGOT HORSPOOL & MATTHEW HUMPHREYS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 39–70 (6th ed. 
2010) (providing an overview of the various institutions of the European Union); see also COUNCIL 
EUR. UNION, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/homepage.aspx?lang=en (last visited Nov. 5, 2012); EUR. 
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2012); EUR. PARLIAMENT, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
52  See, e.g., Single European Act art. 6, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 (granting the European 
Parliament a cooperative role in regulating Europe’s economy and implementing qualified majority 
voting); Treaty on European Union art. G, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 5–44 (same); Treaty of 
Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 
Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon] (same). 
53  Compare TFEU arts. 3–4 (listing the exclusive and shared competences of the EU, respectively), 
with id. art. 6 (describing competences that are reserved to the member states and where the EU’s role is 
merely supportive). 
54  J. Luis Guasch & Robert W. Hahn, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Implications for 
Developing Countries, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 137, 138 (1999). 
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unlikely to exercise rulemaking power that would match their growing 
market size. 
But even wealthy countries differ in their predisposition to regulatory 
intervention. To be a global regulator requires that the state subscribe to 
strict domestic standards that prevail over more lenient standards by the 
simple virtue of being the most stringent. Until the 1980s, the United States 
set the global norms in consumer and environmental regulation, leading 
European firms to adjust to higher standards originating from the United 
States.55 Since then, the roles have been reversed as the EU has increasingly 
adopted tighter standards of consumer and environmental protection while 
the United States has failed to follow the EU’s lead.56 The only way for the 
United States to supersede the European standards today would be to adopt 
even higher standards itself—something that it does not consider to be 
welfare enhancing and thus in its interest. 
EU policymakers’ preference for stringent regulation reflects their 
aversion to risk and commitment to a social market economy.57 European 
consumers rank environment and food safety higher than crime and 
terrorism when asked to evaluate various risks, leading to distinctly high 
levels of consumer and environmental protection.58 European political elites 
have also been ideologically less divided than their U.S. counterparts, and 
consequently are more responsive to the demands of the general public for 
new and more stringent regulations.59 Further, the EU follows the 
precautionary principle, which dictates that precautionary regulatory action 
is proper even in the absence of an absolute, quantifiable certainty of the 
risk, as long as there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially 
 
55  See, e.g., Ragnar E. Löfstedt & David Vogel, The Changing Character of Regulation: A 
Comparison of Europe and the United States, 21 RISK ANALYSIS 399, 400–01 (2001). 
56  See Zaki Laïdi, The Unintended Consequences of European Power 8 (Les Cahiers Européens de 
Sciences Po. No. 5, 2007), available at http://www.cee.sciences-po.fr/erpa/docs/wp_2007_5.pdf (“Up to 
[the late 1980s], it was the United States that set the norms since theirs were the strictest. Since then the 
roles have been reversed.”); R. Daniel Keleman & David Vogel, Trading Places: The US and the EU in 
International Environmental Politics 1–2 & tbl.1 (Sept. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/kelemen%20vogel%20trading%20places%20sept%2007.pdf 
(describing how the EU’s and United States’ respective regulatory preferences have switched over time). 
57  The EU’s commitment to the social market economy is explicitly mentioned as a common 
objective for Europe, added by Article 1 of the new Lisbon Treaty. Treaty of Lisbon art. 1(4) (“[The 
Union] shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and 
price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, . . . and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment.”). 
58  See Laïdi, supra note 56, at 8; see also EUROPEAN COMM’N, SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 217: 
THE ATTITUDES OF EUROPEAN CITIZENS TOWARDS ENVIRONMENT 31–32 (2005), available at http://ec.
europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_217_en.pdf (noting that close to 90% of Europeans believe 
environmental policies are just as important as social or economic ones). 
59  DAVID VOGEL, THE POLITICS OF PRECAUTION: REGULATING HEALTH, SAFETY, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 31–32 (2012). 
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dangerous effects may be inconsistent with the chosen level of protection.60 
In contrast, the risk must first be quantified and found to be unreasonable 
before regulatory intervention can be justified in the United States.61 The 
U.S. regulatory agencies are also guided by cost–benefit analysis, which 
forces them to substantiate that the benefits of intervention outweigh its 
costs.62 To generalize, the United States is therefore more sensitive to the 
costs of regulatory action and “false positive” regulations, whereas the EU 
emphasizes the costs of inaction and the risks of “false negatives.” These 
differences often lead to more extensive regulation originating from the 
EU.63 
The extent of regulation at the EU level also reflects the efforts by 
export-oriented EU firms to seek consistent and predictable regulatory 
frameworks. Uniform regulations have abolished obstacles for doing 
business within the common market—it is more complicated and costly to 
comply with multiple, sometimes conflicting regulations than with a 
harmonized regulatory scheme. And once all European firms have incurred 
the adjustment costs of conforming to common European standards, they 
have preferred that those standards are institutionalized globally. Hence, to 
level the playing field and ensure the competitiveness of European firms, 
EU corporations have sought to export these standards to third countries. 
D. Predisposition to Regulate Inelastic Targets 
Strict domestic regulations can operate as global standards only if such 
strict regulations cannot be circumvented by moving the regulatory targets 
to another jurisdiction. In other words, a state’s ability to override another 
state’s preference for lenient standards is compromised if the target can 
escape the strict regulation by simply relocating. This is the dynamic that 
triggers races to the bottom as producers seek less constraining regulatory 
environments. The EU avoids this circumvention of its standards by 
 
60  See, e.g., Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000) 1 
final (Feb. 2, 2000); see also Sarah Harrell, Beyond “REACH”?: An Analysis of the European Union’s 
Chemical Regulation Program Under World Trade Organization Agreements, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 471, 
481–89 (2007) (contrasting the United States’ “strict risk-assessment approach” with Europe’s 
“precautionary principle”). However, purely hypothetical risk is not sufficient grounds for regulatory 
intervention. See Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. II-3318, para. 142. 
61  See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 
607, 642–46 (1980); see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2011) (laying out general 
principles for regulation in the United States, including reliance on the “least burdensome tools for 
achieving regulatory ends”). 
62  See 3 C.F.R. 215. 
63  However, there are examples of regulatory areas where the United States prefers a stricter rule. 
For instance, the United States is more concerned than the EU is about the adverse effects of smoking. 
See, e.g., Paulette Kurzer, European Citizens Against Globalization: Public Health and Risk Perceptions 
5–12 (April 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.lehigh.edu/~incntr/publications/
documents/kurzer.pdf; see also infra text accompanying notes 292–94 (discussing U.S. financial 
regulation). 
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primarily regulating consumer markets, such as product or food safety. 
Unlike a regulatory target such as capital, which is more mobile, consumers 
rarely move to another jurisdiction in response to strict regulatory 
standards. Thus, as long as a firm willing to trade within the EU wants 
access to its 500 million consumers, it needs to comply with the EU’s 
consumer protection regulations. These consumers cannot be moved to a 
jurisdiction where lesser protections govern what products can be sold to 
them. 
The inelasticity of consumer markets can be contrasted with a global 
corporation’s strategic decision on where to incorporate or enlist, or to a 
shipping company’s decision regarding the flag under which its ship sails. 
While not perfectly elastic, capital is significantly more mobile than 
consumer markets.64 If the EU, for instance, tried to harmonize corporate 
tax levels at excessively high levels, a number of corporations could flee its 
jurisdiction and incorporate elsewhere. Similarly, if the EU were to impose 
a tax on financial transactions, trading activity could be diverted to financial 
centers outside the EU.65 Thus, the EU’s choice of focusing on consumer 
markets in its regulatory endeavors thus far has further reinforced its role as 
a global standard-setter whose regulations cannot be undermined by market 
forces and the elasticity of its targets. 
E. Nondivisibility of Standards 
The above conditions only ensure that the strict jurisdiction is able to 
regulate extraterritorially. Meeting these conditions does not, by itself, 
mean that the strict standard will actually be globalized. The Brussels Effect 
is only triggered when the exporter, after having converted its products or 
business practices to comply with the strict standards, decides to apply this 
new standard to its products or conduct worldwide. In other words, global 
standards emerge only when corporations voluntarily opt to comply with a 
single standard determined by the most stringent regulator, making other 
regulators obsolete in the process. 
The exporter has an incentive to adopt a global standard whenever its 
production or conduct is nondivisible across different markets or when the 
benefits of a uniform standard due to scale economies exceed the costs of 
forgoing lower production costs in less regulated markets. Complying with 
 
64  International capital mobility is contingent on numerous factors and assumes limited exchange 
controls and the ability of foreign corporations and individuals to engage in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and invest in foreign stock markets. See also infra note 294 (discussing whether stock exchange 
listings are indeed elastic). 
65  In the wake of the financial crises in the Eurozone, the Commission has proposed to impose a 
financial transaction tax. However, the U.K., among others, is vehemently opposed. See Joshua Chaffin, 
Business Attacks Transaction Tax Plan, FT.COM (Sept. 28, 2011, 6:36 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/f9d2188a-e9ec-11e0-a149-00144feab49a.html#axzz1rOJUmpsd; see also infra notes 295–96 
(discussing the limits of the Brussels Effect in case of elastic targets including financial transactions). 
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just one regulatory standard allows a corporation to maintain a single 
production process, which is less costly than tailoring its production to meet 
divergent regulatory standards.66 A single standard also facilitates the 
preservation of a uniform global brand.67 Thus, unilateral regulatory 
globalization follows from the nondivisibility of a corporation’s production 
or conduct. 
Nondivisibility of a corporation’s production or conduct occurs in three 
primary types: legal nondivisibility, technical nondivisibility, and economic 
nondivisibility. “Legal nondivisibility” can be seen in global mergers, 
which cannot be consummated on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis—the 
most stringent antitrust jurisdiction gets to determine the fate of the 
transaction worldwide.68 The principle of “technical nondivisibility” often 
applies for the regulation of privacy. For example, the EU forces companies 
like Google to amend their data storage and other business practices to 
conform to European privacy standards. Unable to isolate its data collection 
for the EU for technical reasons, Google is forced to adjust its global 
operations to the most demanding EU standard.69 “Economic 
nondivisibility” is exemplified in market participants’ responses to the EU’s 
health, environmental, and other product standards. An illustrative example 
is European chemical regulation, which applies to all companies seeking to 
enter the EU market.70 Numerous U.S. manufacturers, who would find it too 
costly to develop different products for different consumer markets, choose 
to conform their entire global chemical production to the EU standard.71 The 
scale economies associated with a single global production process 
therefore often allow the EU to effectively dictate the global product 
standards.72 
These examples can be contrasted with attempts to regulate, for 
example, many labor standards. Labor markets are divisible as long as scale 
economies do not require the producer to concentrate production into a 
 
66  See Drezner, supra note 23, at 844–45; David Lazer, Regulatory Interdependence and 
International Governance, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 474, 476–78 (2001). 
67  VOGEL, supra note 59, at 16. 
68  See Anu Bradford, Antitrust Law in Global Markets, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 283, 308–11 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012). 
69  See Ryan Singel, EU Tells Search Engines to Stop Creating Tracking Databases, WIRED (Apr. 8, 
2008, 9:25 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/04/eu-tells-search/ (discussing how EU 
privacy rules on search engines’ data retention practices extend to the United States “due to technical 
difficulty of determining whether a particular user is or isn’t a citizen of an EU country”). 
70  See REACH, supra note 10, arts. 5–7. 
71  See infra notes 134–38. 
72  See also JOEL WALDFOGEL, THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET: WHY YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET 
WHAT YOU WANT (2007) (discussing the distinct advantage of being a standard setter with respect to 
products where the markets can only bear one standard). In such a case, a consumer with a minority taste 
will receive no product. The ability to tip the market in your favor is therefore the only way to ensure 
that products that you value are being produced. 
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single production location. Adhering to one global minimum wage across 
jurisdictions, for instance, entails few scale economies. A corporation can 
maintain different standards in different jurisdictions without difficulty—
ranging from working hours and vacation policies to retirement plans and 
collective labor strategies. When employing labor in Europe, foreign firms 
have to follow the EU’s labor rules, which does not preclude them from 
being able to take advantage of divergent (and presumably lower) standards 
in their home markets.73 
 
 * * * 
 
Thus, a single jurisdiction is able to supply global standards whenever 
that jurisdiction has a large domestic market, sufficient regulatory 
infrastructure, and a preference for regulating inelastic targets with strict 
and nondivisible standards. Otherwise, its regulatory authority can become 
irrelevant since other jurisdictions may supersede its standards or its chosen 
regulatory targets may move to less burdensome jurisdictions or segregate 
their standards across different markets. 
II. EXAMPLES OF UNILATERAL REGULATORY GLOBALIZATION 
The above discussion has focused on the conditions under which a 
state can harness the power of markets to unilaterally globalize its 
standards. The cumulative force of the conditions underlying the Brussels 
Effect suggests that the EU is the predominant entity that can exercise 
global regulatory authority across a wide range of regulatory areas. These 
same conditions also delineate the kind of standards that the EU can 
effectively externalize. This Part illustrates a few representative areas of 
regulatory policy that demonstrate the EU’s ability to unilaterally set global 
rules, focusing on antitrust, privacy, human health, and the environment. It 
also discusses food safety as an example of an area where the EU’s attempt 
to regulate global production has been partially successful. 
A. Antitrust Laws 
The strictest antitrust laws prevail in situations where conflict exists 
among different regulators. If lenient antitrust jurisdiction A and stringent 
antitrust jurisdiction B investigate the same transaction, B’s standard will 
prevail. A company seeking to merge that would be rejected by State B has 
two options: abandon the merger or abandon State B. If State B’s market is 
relatively insignificant, the company might choose the latter. However, if 
 
73  Note that this Article does not argue that labor standards cannot be exported to other jurisdictions 
through other means. The argument is only that to the extent they are divisible, labor standards are not 
amenable to the Brussels Effect. See, e.g., Brian Greenhill et al., Trade-Based Diffusion of Labor Rights: 
A Panel Study, 1986–2002, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 669, 678–80 (2009). 
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State B’s market is large, abandoning it is not often a realistic option.74 At 
the international level, the EU antitrust laws are, indeed, often the most 
stringent.75 The EU also consists of a consumer market that is too large and 
important to abandon. For this reason, the EU antitrust laws have often 
become the de facto global antitrust standards, to which the more 
permissive U.S. antitrust laws must yield.76 
The reasons for the U.S.–EU difference in antitrust enforcement are 
manifold. At the most basic level, the EU antitrust authorities remain 
suspicious of the market’s ability to deliver efficient outcomes and are 
therefore more inclined to intervene through a regulatory process.77 While 
the EU is more fearful of the harmful effects of nonintervention (so called 
“false negatives,” anti-competitive practices that the EU fails to regulate), 
the U.S. authorities are often more mindful of the detrimental effects of 
inefficient intervention (so called “false positives,” pro-competitive 
practices that the United States erroneously restricts).78 Yet given the logic 
of unilateral regulatory globalization, it is the EU approach that determines 
the outcome. 
One of the most famous examples of the EU’s global regulatory clout 
was its decision to prohibit the $42 billion proposed acquisition of 
Honeywell International by General Electric.79 When the EU blocked this 
transaction involving two U.S. companies, it was irrelevant that the U.S. 
antitrust authorities had previously cleared the transaction: the acquisition 
was banned worldwide because it was legally impossible to let the merger 
proceed in one market and prohibit it in another. In this sense, merger 
decisions are legally nondivisible.80 The GE/Honeywell case is emblematic 
 
74  See Bradford, supra note 68, at 310. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. at 309. 
77  See Gunnar Niels & Adriaan ten Kate, Introduction: Antitrust in the U.S. and the EU—
Converging or Diverging Paths?, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 11–15 (2004). 
78  See, e.g., Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Remarks on GE–Honeywell: The U.S. Decision, Before the Antitrust Law Section, State Bar of 
Georgia 16 (Nov. 29, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/9893.pdf (“In the 
United States, we have much greater faith in markets than we do in regulators. . . . [T]he European 
Union comes from a more statist tradition that places greater confidence in the utility of governmental 
intervention in markets.”). 
79  See Commission Decision of 3 July 2001 Declaring a Concentration to be Incompatible with the 
Common Market and the EEA Agreement, Case COMP/M.2220—General Electric/Honeywell, 2004 
O.J. (L 48) 1. In contrast, for the position of U.S. regulatory authorities, see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell 
(May 2, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8140.pdf. 
80  Note that not all antitrust decisions are characterized by nondivisibility. For instance, a company 
may be able to retain different distribution systems in different markets. Thus, if the EU bans certain 
vertical agreements between a manufacturer and its dealer, the manufacturer can often hold onto a 
similar arrangement in another jurisdiction. See also infra note 300 (noting Microsoft’s decision to offer 
an unbundled product only in the EU as an example of divisibility). 
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of a difference in the antitrust regulatory approaches of the EU and the 
United States. The U.S. authorities considered the merger to be efficient 
and hence welfare enhancing. In contrast, the EU was concerned that any 
efficiencies that resulted from the transaction, including a short-term 
decrease in price, would later drive out competitors and result in a long-
term increase in price.81 
While GE/Honeywell is the most famous international antitrust 
enforcement conflict, it does not stand alone.82 The EU similarly threatened 
to block a merger between two U.S. companies, Boeing and McDonnell 
Douglas, even though the deal was already cleared by the U.S. authorities 
without conditions.83 In the end, the EU let the merger proceed subject to 
extensive commitments.84 These included abandoning Boeing’s exclusive 
dealing contracts with various U.S. carriers.85 Similarly, the EU often gets 
to dictate the code of conduct for dominant companies worldwide. For 
example, the EU has imposed record-high fines and behavioral remedies 
against dominant U.S. companies, including Microsoft and Intel.86 
The global nature of antitrust remedies is not unusual. The EU has 
frequently extracted commitments that require parties to modify their 
behavior globally or restructure assets in foreign countries.87 However, the 
United States has similarly restructured deals where parties’ productive 
assets are located offshore. Both the U.S. and EU agencies are vested with 
 
81  See Bradford, supra note 68, at 299; see also Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger 
that Europe Stopped—A Story of the Politics of Convergence, in ANTITRUST STORIES 331, 339–40 
(Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007) (describing the concerns motivating EU antitrust 
regulators in the case). 
82  For instance, see the EU’s decision to block the acquisition of De Havilland by the Avions de 
Transport Régional, which had been approved by the Canadian authorities. Commission Decision of 2 
October 1991 Declaring the Incompatibility with the Common Market of a Concentration, Case 
IV/M.053—Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42. 
83  Boeing Co. et al., Joint Statement Closing Investigation of the Proposed Merger, 5 Trade Reg. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,295 (July 1, 1997). 
84  Commission Decision of 30 July 1997 Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common 
Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, Case No. IV/M.877—Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, 
1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 36–38. 
85  See William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and 
International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805, 838–39 (2001) (discussing commitments). 
86  E.g., Summary of Commission Decision of 13 May 2009, Case COMP/C-3/37.990—Intel, 2009 
O.J. (C 227) 13, 17; Commission Decision of 24 May 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792—Microsoft, 2007 
O.J. (L 32) 23, 27–28; see Stephen Castle, Microsoft Gets Record Fine and a Rebuke from Europe, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, at C3; Editorial, Europe v. U.S. Business, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2008, at A16. 
87  See, e.g., Commission Decision of 22 Feb. 2006, Case COMP/B-2/38.381—De Beers, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38381/38381_1065_1.pdf (requiring De 
Beers to stop buying rough diamonds from a Russian company Alrosa as a commitment in an Article 
102 dominance case); Case COMP/M.5984, Intel/McAfee, EUR-Lex 32011M5984 (Jan. 26, 2011) 
(requiring Intel to unbundle software and security solutions worldwide as a condition for a merger); 
Case COMP/M.5421, Panasonic/Sanyo, EUR-Lex 32009M5421 (Sept. 29, 2009) (imposing an 
obligation to divest one of the parties’ factories in Japan as a condition for a merger). 
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extraterritorial regulatory capacity.88 Both recognize their authority to apply 
laws to foreign companies as long as anticompetitive “effects” are felt on 
their markets. It is thus not the regulatory capacity as such but the EU’s 
sustained preference to impose more frequent and more invasive remedies 
that has made it the world’s de facto antitrust enforcer. In some respect, 
however, the EU Commission has an even greater regulatory capacity than 
its U.S. counterparts: the Commission is empowered to prohibit mergers 
and impose behavioral and structural remedies without first obtaining a 
court judgment.89 Administrative delegation does not reach this far in the 
United States, where the agencies need federal court endorsement to enjoin 
a merger.90 
Critics of the EU’s antitrust activism express concern over “antitrust 
multiple jeopardy” and condemn the EU’s alleged overreach. Some go as 
far as to suggest that the EU’s reluctance to give deference to U.S. antitrust 
agencies’ decisions in the spirit of comity should give way to mutual 
recognition of antitrust decisions.91 This is very unlikely to occur. The EU is 
expected to defend its right to regulate its own market whenever 
competition in that market is affected. The U.S. antitrust authorities know 
this, conceding “We recognize that the EU is entitled to make and interpret 
its own laws.”92 
B. Privacy Regulation 
As with antitrust regulation, the EU often sets the tone globally in the 
regulation of privacy. The EU has adopted stricter privacy regulations than 
the United States.93 In the EU, privacy is widely regarded as a fundamental 
right that cannot, therefore, be contracted away.94 The EU favors 
 
88  See, e.g., Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006); 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945); Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v. 
Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. II-759, paras. 73, 92, 96; see also Eleanor M. Fox, National Law, Global 
Markets, and Hartford: Eyes Wide Shut, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 79–86 (2000) (describing cases of 
extraterritorial assertions of antitrust jurisdiction of both the EU and the United States); Damien Geradin 
et al., Extraterritoriality, Comity, and Cooperation in EU Competition Law, in COOPERATION, COMITY, 
AND COMPETITION POLICY 21, 24–29 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011) (describing bases of 
extraterritorial prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction under EU antitrust law). 
89  See Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004, On the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation), art. 8, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1. 
90  See Kovacic, supra note 85, at 851. 
91  Editorial, supra note 86. 
92  Majoras, supra note 78, at 14. 
93  See Mark F. Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols? EU Internet Privacy and the Post Enlightenment 
Paradigm, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 2–3 (2007). 
94  See id. at 21, 34. “[T]he right to privacy . . . is recognized both in Article 8 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the general principles 
of [European] Community Law.” Id. at 34 (second alteration in original) (quoting Council Directive 
95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 1995 O.J. (L 
281) 31, para. 10 [hereinafter EU Data Protection Directive]). 
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comprehensive legislation that establishes privacy principles for both the 
public and private sectors, enforced by independent regulatory agencies.95 
In contrast, the U.S. data privacy laws are restricted to the public sector and 
some sensitive sectors, including health care and banking.96 The data 
privacy issues of the private sector are largely relegated to self-enforcement 
by the industry.97 Individual companies are allowed to create their own 
privacy policies, and consumers are expected to contract with those 
companies for the level of privacy they want.98 
The EU approach to the protection of privacy rights is spreading 
outside its boundaries. Since the EU’s Data Protection Directive was 
passed, over thirty countries have adopted EU-type privacy laws, including 
most countries participating in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD).99 The United States has been an exception, 
resisting the EU’s lead in privacy protection—at least until very recently. In 
February 2012, the White House published a report, Consumer Data 
Privacy in a Networked World, which urges Congress to adopt a consumer 
privacy “bill of rights.”100 This suggests that the United States may 
eventually come to embrace the EU’s privacy rules. Still, irrespective of 
whether this will happen, the EU privacy standards already affect the 
business practices of many U.S. companies. For instance, Yahoo! was 
prosecuted before French courts for the material that it made available on its 
U.S. website because that material was accessible to French citizens.101 And 
this is just one example of the many lawsuits against U.S. companies in 
European courts.102 
 
95  See EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 94, arts. 3, 28. 
96  See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(4) (2006) (defining “records” protected by the 
Act as limited to certain categories, and limiting the application of the Act to government agencies); see 
also Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in 
the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 23–28 (2000) (describing privacy 
protection in the United States, including state privacy acts). The protection of individual privacy was 
further weakened in the United States in the wake of September 11 when privacy interests gave way to 
concerns of public safety. See Kelly Fiveash, Euro Commissioner Tells Facebook It Has Nowhere to 
Hide, REGISTER (June 21, 2011, 13:03 GMT), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/06/21/viviane_reding_
interview/ (interviewing Viviane Reding, EU Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and 
Citizenship, on the EU–U.S. difference in approach to privacy protection). 
97  See Bach & Newman, supra note 46, at 833. However, recent developments suggest that the U.S. 
government is moving towards a more aggressive stand in its enforcement of privacy rights. See, e.g., 
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Gives Final Approval to Settlement with Google over Buzz 
Rollout (Oct. 24, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/10/buzz.shtm. 
98  See Bach & Newman, supra note 46, at 833. 
99  See id. at 833–34. 
100  See WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 1–26 (2012), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf. 
101  The Internet: Vive La Liberté!, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2000, at 75. 
102  See, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 96, at 43 (discussing the aftermath of American Airlines being sued 
in Sweden after transferring data from Sweden to a U.S. electronic reservation system without prior 
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The EU believes that its high privacy standards are compromised if the 
protected data is made available in other jurisdictions. For this reason, the 
EU bans the transfer of data from the EU to third countries that fail to 
ensure “an adequate level of protection” of data privacy rights.103 What 
constitutes “adequate” is defined case by case by the EU. U.S. companies 
have strongly criticized the EU’s regulatory efforts, referring to 
“unreasonable restraints” on their business practices and the high costs of 
compliance.104 Their disapproval is only likely to grow as the EU proceeds 
to enact a new, even more stringent privacy law with an extraterritorial 
reach.105 The proposed new data protection regulation, expected to take 
effect in 2014, further expands Internet users’ rights against service 
providers.106 Particularly far-reaching is the new law’s proposed “right to be 
forgotten”—the Internet user’s right to demand all data on him or her to be 
permanently deleted upon request.107 The new law also envisions bolstering 
the EU’s enforcement efforts with tougher penalties, including fines up to 
2% of the company’s annual global revenue.108 This planned expansion of 
privacy rights is expected to severely curtail the business practices of 
foreign corporations and, according to its vehement critics in the United 
States, “represents the biggest threat to free speech on the Internet in the 
coming decade.”109 
Yet many U.S. corporations have already adopted, however 
reluctantly, privacy policies that satisfy the EU requirements. Numerous 
U.S. corporations have also voluntarily signed onto the EU‒U.S. negotiated 
“Safe Harbor Principles,” issued by the Department of Commerce after the 
EU Directive entered into force.110 The Safe Harbor Agreement stipulates 
 
customer consent); see also Cecilia Kang, Promise by Google Ends FTC’s Privacy-Breach Probe, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2010, at A15 (discussing the FTC’s decision to close its investigation against 
Google’s Street View service, in sharp contrast to European regulators). 
103  See EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 94, arts. 25; see also Shaffer, supra note 96, at 21–
23 (discussing in more detail these same Directive provisions, and analyzing whether the United States, 
as a third-party country, would assure an adequate level of protection). 
104  See Shaffer, supra note 96, at 75; cf. id. at 17–20. 
105  Kevin J. O’Brien, Europe Plans to Tighten Web Privacy and Apply It to U.S. Companies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at B4. 
106  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data 
(General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter General Data 
Protection Regulation]. 
107  Id. art. 17. 
108  See Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of Data 
Protection Rules to Increase Users’ Control of Their Data and to Cut Costs for Businesses (Jan. 25, 
2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/46. 
109  Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012). 
110  See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000). While signing on to the Safe Harbor Principles is voluntary, the signatories 
are bound by them. Failure to adhere to their commitments subjects the signatories to FTC enforcement 
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that U.S. firms active in the EU market comply with EU privacy rules even 
when their data are processed in the United States.111 Despite being 
otherwise “strong-armed” into the Agreement,112 the United States managed 
to negotiate one important exception: the EU conceded to allow airlines to 
transfer passenger records to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 
the interest of U.S. national security.113 
The nondivisibility of data has further facilitated the globalization of 
the EU’s privacy policy. While national regulations may differ from 
country to country, “data flows lightly and instantly across borders.”114 
Multinational corporations have adjusted their global data management 
systems to reduce their compliance costs with multiple regulatory 
regimes.115 Internet companies find it difficult to create different programs 
for different markets and therefore tend to apply the strictest international 
standards across the board. At times, it is technologically difficult or 
impossible to separate data involving European and non-European 
citizens.116 Other times it may be feasible but too costly to create special 
websites or data-processing practices just for the EU.117 As a result, the 
technical or the economic nondivisibility of the EU rules has prompted 
several U.S. companies ranging from Google to General Motors to amend 
their global privacy practices.118 Indeed, today many multinational 
 
actions under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act against unfair or deceptive acts or practices. See 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE 
BARRIERS: EUROPEAN UNION 143, 166 (2010). 
111  See Bach & Newman, supra note 46, at 833–34. 
112  David Bach & Abraham L. Newman, Local Power, Global Reach: The Domestic Institutional 
Roots of Internet Governance, ST. ANTONY’S INT’L REV., May 2007, at 23, 29. 
113  See Bach & Newman, supra note 46, at 834; Council Decision 2007/551/CFSP/JHA of 23 July 
2007, on the Signing of an Agreement Between the European Union and the United States of America 
on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United 
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2007 O.J. (L 204) 16. 
114  Legal Confusion on Internet Privacy: The Clash of Data Civilizations, ECONOMIST, June 19, 
2010, at 63. 
115  See Bach & Newman, supra note 112, at 29; see also DOROTHEE HEISENBERG, NEGOTIATING 
PRIVACY: THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED STATES, AND PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 119 (2005) 
(“Indeed, there is a hint that it has already become cheaper for US multinational companies to treat all 
data (including US data) with the same strict privacy standard as the data of the Europeans.”). 
116  See Singel, supra note 69. 
117  See Mitchener, supra note 3. 
118  See, e.g., Legal Confusion on Internet Privacy, supra note 114 (discussing changes the EU 
demanded in Google Buzz, the firm’s social network service); Kevin J. O’Brien, Anger in Europe over 
Google and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2010, at B5 (discussing personal information Google 
collected through Street View, and Google’s response); Scheer, supra note 3 (discussing GM, DuPont, 
and Procter & Gamble’s practice of applying EU-like standards to its employee data worldwide); see 
also Mark Berniker, EU: Microsoft Agrees to .NET Passport Changes, DATAMATION (Jan. 30, 2003), 
http://www.datamation.com/entdev/article.php/1576901/EU-Microsoft-Agrees-to-NET-Passport-
Changes.htm (discussing Microsoft’s agreement with EU authorities to implement a data protection plan 
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companies have only one company-wide privacy protection policy—and it 
is Europe’s.119 
C. Health Protection: Regulation of Chemicals 
The EU has also become the preeminent global regulator of the 
chemicals industry. This reflects Europeans’ elevated concern for the 
adverse effects that unsafe chemicals have on humans and on the 
environment. The Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction 
of Chemicals (REACH) is an EU chemicals regulation that has had a 
substantial impact on a global scale.120 The chemicals industry is 
multinational, and the EU is an important destination market for a vast 
number of chemicals as well as goods and preparations containing 
chemicals.121 
REACH, which was enacted in 2007, builds on an idea of industry 
responsibility. Embracing the idea of “no data, no market,” REACH places 
the burden of proof on manufacturers and importers as opposed to 
regulators.122 Manufacturers and importers are required to gather 
information on the effects that their substances have on human health and 
the environment, and to provide this information to EU authorities.123 
Another important feature of REACH is that it was enacted to regulate not 
only new chemicals that enter the stream of commerce but also tens of 
thousands of “existing substances” that had been placed on the EU market 
before they were regulated.124 According to the Commission, these 
chemicals represent 99% of the total substances on the market.125 The 
implementation of REACH is also guided by the “precautionary principle,” 
which lowers the threshold for regulatory intervention.126 
 
119  See Mitchener, supra note 3 (citing Microsoft’s Director of Corporate Privacy, who confirmed 
that Microsoft applies one company-wide privacy standard, and that is the EU standard). 
120  REACH, supra note 10. 
121  See Melody M. Bomgardner, Facts & Figures of the Chemical Industry, CHEMICAL & 
ENGINEERING NEWS, July 4, 2011, at 33–67 (describing European chemical shipments of $428.5 billion 
and European chemical imports worth $98.6 billion for 2010). 
122  See REACH, supra note 10, art. 5; Joanne Scott, From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic 
Travels of European Law and the Chemistry of Regulatory Attraction, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 897, 898–99 
(2009) (explaining the individual responsibility required for the industry actors to provide data in order 
to participate in the market). 
123  See Doaa Abdel Motaal, Reaching REACH: The Challenge for Chemicals Entering 
International Trade, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 643, 645 (2009); Scott, supra note 122. 
124  See Commission White Paper: Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy, at 7–8, 28, COM (2001) 
88 final (Feb. 27, 2001) (referring to the “burden of the past”—i.e., the past effects of the 30,000 
chemicals already on the market in the EU—as a motivation for regulating existing chemicals). 
125  Id. at 6. 
126  See TFEU art. 191(2); cf. Case C-180/96, United Kingdom v. Comm’n, 1998 E.C.R. I-2269, 
para. 99 (“Where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human health, the 
institutions may take protective measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of 
those risks become fully apparent.”). 
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REACH represents a stark difference from its U.S. counterpart, the 
Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA), which continues to place the burden 
of proof on regulators.127 While REACH requires companies to develop 
information on the safety of their chemicals, the TSCA requires companies 
to develop this information only if directed to do so by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).128 The EPA also has a high evidentiary burden 
when requesting safety data, leading it to restrict or ban very few 
chemicals.129 The TSCA is further weakened by its provision grandfathering 
95% of existing chemicals and thus forgoing any testing with respect to the 
vast majority of the chemicals on the market.130 
The global spread of REACH has met with resistance at the 
international level. As the regulation applies to approximately 30,000 
chemicals, its impact on the $600 billion U.S. chemical industry is 
profound.131 Critics claim that REACH imposes significant costs and 
challenges on manufacturers and importers, particularly related to the 
supply chain, sales, and procurement.132 At worst, the regulation is said to 
impede innovation and the development of new substances due to fears that 
they would not meet the more stringent European requirements.133 
Despite this resistance, the de facto Brussels Effect has ensured that 
REACH is effecting change at a global level.134 Multinational firms 
including Ikea, Lego, and Mattel have declared their global production to be 
PVC free.135 Dow Chemical announced all of its production to be REACH-
consistent, whether they are sold in the EU or elsewhere.136 Large cosmetics 
producers such as Revlon, Unilever, and L’Oreal have similarly 
reformulated all their products to be REACH-compatible, while Estee 
 
127  15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2006). 
128  See Motaal, supra note 123, at 647. 
129  The EPA needs to provide “substantial evidence” that the chemical presents “unreasonable risk” 
to health or the environment, in addition to justifying the regulatory intervention under a cost–benefit 
analysis. This high standard of proof has led, for instance, to the EPA’s failure to regulate asbestos. See 
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Scott, supra note 122, at 
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can regulate or restrict chemicals). 
130  See Wirth, supra note 36, at 102. 
131  See Mark Schapiro, New Power for ‘Old Europe,’ NATION, Dec. 27, 2004, at 11, 12; Scott, 
supra note 122, at 902 (noting the size of the U.S. chemicals industry). 
132  See LAWRENCE A. KOGAN, EXPORTING PRECAUTION: HOW EUROPE’S RISK-FREE REGULATORY 
AGENDA THREATENS AMERICAN FREE ENTERPRISE 40–43 (2005), available at http://www.wlf.org/
upload/110405MONOKogan.pdf. 
133  See, e.g., Anne Pouillot et al., REACH: Impact on the US Cosmetics Industry?, 8 J. COSMETIC 
DERMATOLOGY 3, 5–6 (2009). 
134  See Wirth, supra note 36, at 102–03; see also Scott, supra note 122, at 908–20 (describing how 
REACH’s effect on U.S. businesses has prompted state-level harmonization attempts). 
135  VOGEL, supra note 59, at 204. 
136  Id. at 169. 
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Lauder uses a single safety standard for 95% of its production.137 Many 
foreign chemical manufacturers that export a significant amount of 
chemicals to the EU are switching to REACH standards to avoid being 
excluded from the large and lucrative EU market. Since they often find it 
cheaper to create a single product for all markets, they have an incentive to 
produce their products in accordance with the strictest global standards, 
which happens to be the EU’s REACH standard.138 Here nondivisibility is 
driven by scale economies in production rather than a legal or technical 
inability to produce different products or pursue different conduct in 
different markets. Another reason for conforming to REACH is that many 
downstream users of chemicals refuse to include substances in their 
products if the EU has identified any such substance as a “substance of very 
high concern.”139 
In addition to this kind of de facto Brussels Effect, REACH has 
triggered a more limited de jure Brussels Effect, prompting international 
adoption of REACH-style laws.140 Producers outside the EU who adopt 
stricter and more expensive REACH standards in order to export to the EU 
have an incentive to pressure their home governments to increase their 
domestic regulations to the level of REACH. Since their exports already 
meet REACH standards, they could then produce similar products for both 
markets at a lower cost than could domestic competitors who do not export 
to the EU and, therefore, have not yet developed EU-compliant production 
processes.141 Similarly, a de jure Brussels Effect would level the playing 
field in the domestic market against foreign producers that are not active in 
the EU market and that similarly do not, therefore, conform to the EU rules. 
This type of lobbying has been reinforced by consumer health and 
environmental activists who have embraced the EU regulation and used it 
as a benchmark in their efforts to influence domestic debates on the issue.142 
In the United States, REACH has prompted state-level regulatory 
reforms and the introduction of congressional bills seeking to amend the 
 
137  Id. at 217. 
138  See Scott, supra note 122, at 939–40; Henrik Selin & Stacy D. VanDeveer, Raising Global 
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REACH (discussing the implications of REACH in the entire supply network). 
140  REACH-type regulations have been adopted in countries such as Canada, Australia, China, 
South Korea, Japan, and Russia. See VOGEL, supra note 59, at 170. 
141  See Yoshiko Naiki, Assessing Policy Reach: Japan’s Chemical Policy Reform in Response to the 
EU’s REACH Regulation, 22 J. ENVTL. L. 171, 178 (2010). 
142  Scott, supra note 122, at 920–28. 
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TSCA.143 These legislative efforts acknowledge the global nature of the 
chemical industry and the existing need for U.S. companies to comply with 
REACH, including collecting the safety information relevant for their 
production.144 In California, for instance, the existing informational burden 
imposed by REACH was seen as a compelling reason to utilize the same 
data in California as well. As a result, the California Department of Toxic 
Substances Control is now required to use “to the maximum extent 
feasible” the safety information generated in other nations in its regulation 
of chemical products, including, most importantly, the EU.145 
D. Environmental Protection 
While REACH is often considered a health measure, its provisions are 
also directly geared at protecting the environment. Yet REACH does not 
stand alone among the environmental measures spread through the Brussels 
Effect. Before REACH was adopted, the EU already regulated the 
management of hazardous substances and electronic waste.146 The 2003 
Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive (RoHS Directive) bans the 
release of hazardous substances into the environment when many common 
products such as household appliances and computers reach the end of their 
useful life.147 The Commission has recently extended the Directive to cover 
all electrical and electronic products.148 
The RoHS Directive has been exported to other jurisdictions through 
both a de facto and de jure Brussels Effect. Foreign manufacturers 
exporting products into the EU prefer to comply with one set of standards 
and thus make their entire production RoHS-compliant.149 This has led to a 
global change in the design of electronic products.150 In addition, several 
 
143  Id. at 914–20 (discussing regulatory reforms in Maine and Massachusetts and in Congress). 
144  Id. 
145  Id. at 910–14 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25252(b)(2) (West Supp. 2012)). 
146  See Directive 2002/95/EC, supra note 9, art. 1 (laying out the EU policy on the restriction of the 
use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment); see also Directive 
2002/96/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 on Waste Electric and 
Electronic Equipment (WEEE), 2003 O.J. (L 37) 24. 
147  See Directive 2002/95/EC, supra note 9. 
148  See Press Release, European Comm’n, Environment: Fewer Risks from Hazardous Substances 
in Electrical and Electronic Equipment (July 20, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/11/912&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
149  See Legislation on Electrical and Electronic Equipment Enters New Phase, ENV’T FOR 
EUROPEANS, Mar. 2011, at 10, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/news/efe/pdf/efe42/EN-
EFE42-110328.pdf; see also Selin & VanDeveer, supra note 138, at 14 (reaching the same conclusion). 
150  See Press Release, supra note 148 (referring to the RoHS Directive having led to “important 
changes in product design in the European Union and worldwide”); see also Otto Pohl, European 
Environmental Rules Propel Change in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2004, at F4 (discussing the global 
nature of the electronics business and noting that “a multinational that redesigns its product to eliminate 
a substance banned in the E.U. often finds it cheaper to sell that product worldwide”); About the RoHS 
Directive, FUJITSU, http://www.fujitsu.com/emea/services/components/thermal-printers/rohs.html (last 
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jurisdictions outside the EU have adopted RoHS-type laws, including 
China, Japan, and South Korea.151 California also responded to the EU’s 
strict electronic waste regulation by explicitly incorporating EU standards 
into its Electronic Waste Recycling Act of 2003.152 This Act, referred to as 
the “Cal RoHS,” bans the sale of electronic devices in California when 
those devices are banned in the EU and, rather strikingly, also states that 
amendments to the EU directive will be incorporated into California law.153 
The most recent example of EU environmental unilateralism relates to 
its emissions trading scheme (ETS). The ETS forms a cornerstone of the 
EU’s climate change policy. As of January 1, 2012, the EU folded aviation 
into this scheme.154 All airlines, including foreign ones, have to buy 
emission permits for all their flights that depart from or land at European 
airports. This way, airlines cannot limit their compliance to the part of the 
journey that takes place in the European airspace, making the scheme 
nondivisible. For instance, on a flight from San Francisco to London, only 
9% of the emissions are calculated to occur in the EU airspace (29%, 37%, 
and 25% of the emissions occurring over the United States, Canada, and the 
high seas, respectively).155 Yet the airline must acquire emission permits for 
each ton of emissions emitted across the entire flight since the point of 
landing is the EU.156 A foreign airline refusing to comply is subject to a 
fine157 or, even more severely, could be banned from European airports.158 
United, Continental, and American Airlines, supported by the U.S. Air 
Transport Association, challenged their inclusion in the scheme before U.K. 
courts, alleging that the U.K.’s decision to implement the EU Directive 
 
visited Nov. 6, 2012) (stating Fujitsu’s compliance with RoHS); Oracle Global Position on Restriction 
of Hazardous Substances (RoHS), ORACLE (Oct. 2012), http://www.oracle.com/us/products/
applications/green/rohs-position-185078.pdf (stating Oracle’s global compliance with RoHS). 
151  See Selin & VanDeveer, supra note 138, at 14–15. 
152  See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 42460–42486 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012). The EU’s RoHS 
Directive is referenced in § 42465.2(b). 
153  See id. §§ 42463, 42465.2(b); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25214.10(b) (West 2006); Scott, 
supra note 122, at 942. 
154  See Directive 2008/101/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 
2008 Amending Directive 2003/87/EC So as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community, 2009 O.J. (L 8) 3 [hereinafter 
Directive 2008/101/EC]. 
155  Nancy N. Young, Vice President of Envtl. Affairs, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc., Statement 
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee: The 
European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme: A Violation of International Law 4 (July 27, 2011), 
available at http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyAviation/2011-07-27- 
Young.pdf. 
156  Id. at 4–5. 
157  Id. 
158  See Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & Climate Change, 
EUR-Lex 62010CJ0366 (Dec. 21, 2011). 
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violates international law.159 The U.K. Court referred the question to the 
European Court of Justice. The European Court confirmed the validity of 
the ETS Directive with various international agreements and customary 
international law, concluding that the “application of the emissions trading 
scheme to aircraft operators infringes neither the principle of territoriality 
nor the sovereignty of third States.”160 The Court emphasized that an aircraft 
flying over the high seas is not subject to the ETS. Only when the aircraft is 
physically in the member state of the EU—i.e., lands in or departs from an 
airport situated in the EU—does the EU attach jurisdiction on the operator 
of that aircraft.161 
Airlines are exempted from the ETS with respect to their flights 
landing in the EU, but not with respect to their flights taking off from the 
EU, if they are subject to “equivalent measures” in their home 
jurisdiction.162 Whether domestic climate regulation in the United States or 
China, for instance, would qualify as an equivalent provision is subject to 
the EU’s unilateral decision.163 China, for instance, has already proposed 
domestic emissions-cutting measures and asked the EU to consider those as 
“equivalent” to what the EU requires.164 It is plausible that the EU’s 
unilateralism will prompt countries to either adopt tougher domestic climate 
change regulations or consider adopting international measures. And even if 
no such de jure Brussels Effect takes place, compliance costs with EU rules 
will likely lead to increasing demands to design planes with fuel efficiency 
improvements. It is also doubtful that the airlines would limit these 
improvements to planes that fly to Europe but would more likely order 
entire fleets of planes that allow them to meet the stricter EU standards 
more cost-effectively, confirming the de facto Brussels Effect. 
 
159  See ATA Challenges Application of the EU ETS to U.S. Airlines, AIRLINES FOR AM., http://www.
airlines.org/Pages/ATA-challenges-the-application-of-the-EU-ETS-to-U.S.-Airlines.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2012). According to the plaintiffs, the ETS Directive violates a number of international 
agreements, including the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), the Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Air Transport 
Agreement between the United States and the EU and its member states (Open Skies Agreement). 
160  Press Release No. 139/11, Court of Justice of the European Union, The Directive Including 
Aviation Activities in the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme is Valid 2 (Dec. 21, 2011), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-12/cp110139en.pdf (discussing Case C-
366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am.). 
161  See Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., paras. 122–127. 
162  See Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 154, para. 17; see also Joanne Scott & Lavanya 
Rajamani, EU Climate Change Unilateralism, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 469, 482–83 (2012) (discussing the 
equivalency concept in more detail). 
163  See Scott & Rajamani, supra note 162, at 475. 
164  See Saqib Rahim, U.S.-E.U. Showdown over Airline Emissions Begins Today, N.Y. TIMES (July 
5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/07/05/05climatewire-us-eu-showdown-over-airline-
emissions-begins-88684.html. 
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E. Food Safety 
The EU’s attempt to regulate Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs) is an example where the EU has been partially successful in 
externalizing its food safety regulations but where the Brussels Effect has 
been incomplete. It therefore offers a particularly interesting case to 
examine the relative importance of the various conditions that underlie the 
Brussels Effect. 
The EU and the United States take starkly opposing views on the 
regulation of biotechnology. The United States regards GMO products as 
substantially similar to products made using traditional production methods. 
GMO products can therefore be cultivated and marketed in the United 
States without extensive premarket safety studies or the need to specifically 
label them.165 In contrast, the EU subjects GMOs to extensive regulation 
based on their potential adverse health effects. The GMOs have to go 
through a lengthy approval process, which entails an evaluation of the risk 
the GMOs pose to human health and the environment.166 The evaluation is 
also guided by the precautionary principle, which justifies regulatory 
intervention in the presence of scientific uncertainty.167 The EU further 
requires that most authorized foods, ingredients, and animal feeds 
containing over 0.9% GMOs be labeled.168 
Several reasons explain the U.S.–EU regulatory divergence.169 The 
United States is the world’s leading GMO producer whereas GMOs are 
hardly cultivated in the EU.170 Biotechnology is seen as a key for retaining 
the U.S. competitiveness in export markets, while the EU places cultural 
importance on small-scale farming and remains skeptical of mass 
production technologies.171 Consequently, U.S. farmers and the entire 
biotechnology industry are influential players in the U.S. political process, 
whereas farmers producing non-GMO crops wield influence in the EU. At 
its root, however, the divergence mirrors very different consumer 
preferences with respect to food safety across the Atlantic. Survey data 
 
165  See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,988, 
22,991 (May 29, 1992). 
166  Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 
2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1, 2. 
167  See Joanne Scott, European Regulation of GMOs and the WTO, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 213, 219–
24 (2003). 
168  Regulation (EC) No. 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 
2003 Concerning the Traceability and Labelling of Genetically Modified Organisms, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 
24, 26–27. 
169  But see Aseem Prakash & Kelly L. Kollman, Biopolitics in the EU and the U.S.: A Race to the 
Bottom or Convergence to the Top?, 47 INT’L STUD. Q. 617, 629–34 (2003) (discussing how U.S. and 
EU regulatory approaches may be converging as state-level legislative activity and court challenges 
against GMOs grow). 
170  Id. at 627. 
171  Id. 
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show that 62% of Europeans are worried about the food safety risks posed 
by GMOs and 71% of Europeans do not want GMOs in their food,172 
whereas U.S. consumers have shown little interest or concern for the 
issue.173 
The above discussion suggests that the EU certainly has the requisite 
propensity to regulate GMOs with the strictest standards. Arguably, over 
time, the EU has also built the kind of institutional capacity that would 
allow it to exercise this regulatory authority.174 GMOs are also characterized 
as falling under inelastic consumer protection regulation, which ensures 
that the EU’s regulatory clout cannot be circumvented by moving the 
regulatory targets to another jurisdiction. But it is less clear that the other 
conditions for the Brussels Effect are present. For U.S. farmers, the EU is 
only the fifth largest export market and accounts for just 8% of U.S. 
agricultural exports.175 Many producers should thus afford to forgo the EU 
market and divert their trade elsewhere.176 At the same time, an increasing 
number of other countries, including Australia, Brazil, China, and Japan, 
are following the EU’s lead and adopting mandatory labeling schemes for 
GMO products.177 This narrows the U.S. farmers’ scope for trade diversion. 
At first glance, it appears that GMOs should also be divisible and thus 
not amenable to the Brussels Effect. In principle, U.S. farmers could 
separate their production and cultivate both GMO and non-GMO varieties 
destined for domestic and export markets, respectively. Yet such division 
can be difficult in practice. The GMO crops must be segregated from the 
time they are planted throughout the processing and marketing chain. This 
entails separating growing areas and preventing pollen drift from GMO 
 
172  See EUROPEAN COMM’N, EUROBAROMETER 55.2: EUROPEANS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY 40 
(2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/press/2001/pr0612en-report.pdf (presenting data on 
Europeans’ perceptions of GMOs specifically, with 71% of respondents agreeing with the statement, “I 
do not want this type of food”); EUROPEAN COMM’N, SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 238: RISK ISSUES 53 
(2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_238_en.pdf (presenting data on 
Europeans’ perception of various food-related risks, with 62% concerned about GMOs). 
173  See Prakash & Kollman, supra note 169, at 627 (citing an Environics poll, which reported that 
while 78% of Americans support agriculture biotechnology, the comparable figure in Germany was 
54%, 52% in France, 36% in Britain, and 29% in Spain). 
174  See ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN, PROTECTORS OF PRIVACY: REGULATING PERSONAL DATA IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 147 (2008), in which Newman argues that regulatory capacity is the key variable 
explaining global regulatory outcomes. He argues that the EU initially had fragmented institutional 
capacity with respect to food safety, explaining its limited ability to export its preferences globally. 
However, he reasons that the establishment of the European Food Safety Agency “could substantially 
strengthen the European position.” Id. 
175  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 2010, at XV-3 tbl.15-3 (2010). 
176  However, trade diversion may entail the producers being able to sell their crop at a lower price in 
alternative export markets. 
177  See Prakash & Kollman, supra note 169, at 632; see also VOGEL, supra note 59, at 89 (noting 
that “[a]s of 2002, seventeen countries had adopted mandatory GM food labeling requirements”). 
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fields to non-GMO fields.178 Producers and distributors must also use 
separate equipment, storage areas, and shipping containers, and establish 
trait identification systems that allow for the tracking of produce from the 
farm to the consumer.179 The specific processes by which U.S. farmers 
gather and transport their crops for distribution often make their harvests 
inseparable in practice.180 At a minimum, separation of production is costly. 
This technical and economic nondivisibility of GMO production has led 
some farmers to choose to forgo the risks and costs of separation, and 
converge to the strictest standard by only cultivating EU-approved GMO 
crops—irrespective of where these crops are sold.181 
The practical nondivisibility of production is enhanced by the influence 
and business practices of multinational food processors.182 They are 
reluctant to make separate batches for the EU and United States and 
frequently refuse to buy corn that could potentially cause them marketing 
problems in the EU.183 Even if they secured an authorization for their 
products, the labeling requirement makes products containing GMOs 
unmarketable in practice. Thus, the possibility that a non-EU-approved 
variety can be found within the bulk means that the entire crop is unfit for 
sale to multinational food processors that export to the EU. By refusing to 
purchase even conventional grain from farmers who also plant GMO 
varieties, these food processors have steered some U.S. farmers away from 
GMO products altogether.184 
Finally, unlike the other fields of regulation discussed above, GMOs 
are an interesting test case for the Brussels Effect because it is an area 
where the United States challenged the EU’s regulatory stance before the 
 
178  See CHARLES E. HANRAHAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21556, AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE U.S.-EU DISPUTE 5 (2010); see also Case C-442/09, Bablok v. Freistaat Bayern, 
EUR-Lex 62009CJ0442, at 8 (Sept. 6, 2011) (confirming that honey containing traces of GMOs due to 
accidental contamination from GMO test fields that were 500 meters away nonetheless is considered 
food produced from a GMO under European food law). 
179  HANRAHAN, supra note 178. 
180  See Young, supra note 44, at 467–68. 
181  Id. at 469; see also VOGEL, supra note 59, at 86 (noting that over 95% of the GMO corn 
production in the United States today concentrates on the varieties approved in the EU, notwithstanding 
a greater number of GMO varieties approved in the United States, and similarly, that almost all GMO 
soybean production in the United States employs the single variety approved by the EU). 
182  For instance, firms like Unilever and Nestle have pledged not to use GMOs in any of their 
products, irrespective of the end market. Gerber and Heinz similarly exclude GMOs from all of their 
baby food, including baby food sold on the U.S. market. See VOGEL, supra note 59, at 86. 
183  Mitchener, supra note 3. 
184  See id.; see also Wirth, supra note 36, at 104 (referring to the “virtual collapse of the market for 
U.S. exports of corn” following the EU’s labeling requirements, and noting that U.S. rice and wheat 
farmers have steered away from GMO varieties for the same reason). Similarly, multinational restaurant 
retailers operating in the EU, including McDonalds, have requested their contract farmers to produce 
only non-GMO crops to mitigate consumer backlash in the EU. See Prakash & Kollman, supra note 169, 
at 632. 
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WTO and won a trade dispute in 2006.185 Yet, for the reasons discussed 
below in Part V, the negative ruling by the WTO has done little to 
compromise the EU’s regulation of GMOs. The EU has failed to comply 
with the ruling, and transatlantic trade involving GMOs remains 
restricted.186 As a result, U.S. producers of GMO varieties continue to feel 
the (limited) Brussels Effect due to their inability to altogether ignore the 
EU market and their dependence on multinational companies who prefer to 
cater to a single global standard and remain sensitive to potential risks and 
liabilities they may face in the EU. 
III. THE EU’S MOTIVATIONS 
The EU’s exercise of global regulatory clout can spring from various 
motivations—both external and internal. Some commentators argue that the 
EU’s external policies reflect “imperialistic” objectives whereas others 
emphasize the EU’s role as a benevolent hegemon.187 The charges of 
regulatory imperialism appear misguided. A more compelling account 
suggests that the EU is guided primarily by internal motivations stemming 
from its need to preserve the single market without undermining the 
competitiveness of European companies. Externalization of the single 
market also serves the bureaucratic interests of the European Commission 
and allows for the maximization of interest group support embracing 
corporations and consumer advocates alike. 
A. External Motivations 
In contrast to the United States’ unilateralism in international affairs, 
the EU is often portrayed as a champion of multilateral cooperation and 
universal norms.188 However, the EU’s commitment to multilateralism and 
universalism must be qualified. The EU is an influential global player with 
the ability and the willingness to shape the international order to its liking. 
It seeks to vigorously promote its interests on the global stage, both 
 
185  Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, paras. 8.1–.33, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006). 
186  See HANRAHAN, supra note 178, at 6; see also Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/311, at 6–7 
(Mar. 15, 2012) (discussing the continuing concerns of the United States regarding the EU’s backlog of 
approvals of biotech product applications); European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products: Current Status, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm (last updated Feb. 24, 2010) (discussing the United States’ 
request to “retaliate” against the EU for failing to comply with the judgment). 
187  See generally Ian Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, 40 J. 
COMMON MARKET STUD. 235, 235 (2002) (arguing that the EU is a “normative power” in world 
politics). These concepts are further elaborated below. See also infra notes 188, 190–93, 196–200 and 
accompanying text. 
188  See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1971, 1975–76, 2005–06 (2004). 
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unilaterally and multilaterally. In doing so, the EU acts like any great power 
with the desire to ensure that international norms reflect its preferences.189 
Some scholars suggest that the EU’s motivations are imperialistic—
that the EU is, in fact, seeking to exert political and economic domination 
over other countries.190 The EU does have significant leverage over 
countries that seek closer cooperation with, or eventually membership in, 
the EU.191 But even outside of its immediate sphere of influence, critics 
maintain that the EU is engaged in a novel form of imperialism. Instead of 
pursuing its goals through military and political instruments, the EU has 
been accused of relying on economic and bureaucratic tools of dominion 
over countries that are dependent on access to its vast domestic market.192 
Lawrence A. Kogan, criticizing the EU’s extensive regulatory reach in 
environmental and food safety matters, put it bluntly: 
[T]he EU has embarked upon an adventure in environmental cultural 
imperialism. This is a global practice reminiscent of an earlier European 
colonial era. And the fact that Europe is using “soft power” to enforce it will 
hardly make it more palatable to people who will be unable to feed themselves 
as a result.193 
While critics claim that the EU is exporting its standards without the 
consent of other states, the EU counters that it is not engaged in coercion—
it is simply enforcing the norms of the single market equally on domestic 
and foreign players and merely asking others to play by its rules when 
operating in its home market. Still, the EU’s regulatory stance is not 
inconsistent with a desire to shape the global regulatory environment and 
 
189  See Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 53 (2011) (arguing that most major international powers are exceptionalist in that they 
“seek to embody their values and interests in international law”). 
190  See, e.g., JAN ZIELONKA, EUROPE AS EMPIRE: THE NATURE OF THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN 
UNION 9–22 (2006); Jan Zielonka, Europe as a Global Actor: Empire by Example?, 84 INT’L AFF. 471, 
471, 475 n.17 (2008) [hereinafter Zielonka, Empire by Example]; see also KOGAN, supra note 132, at 98 
(arguing that Europe’s goal is to establish the precautionary principle not only as a regional standard but 
also “as an absolute global legal standard”). 
191  See Laïdi, supra note 56, at 9–10; see also Zielonka, Empire by Example, supra note 190, at 476 
(discussing how negotiations with candidate countries are highly asymmetrical and the countries are 
presented with two options: adopting the entire body of EU laws and regulations as a condition for 
membership, or not joining the club). 
192  See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 3 (referring to the EU as “try[ing] to force the rest of the 
world . . . to play by its cumbersome rules” as well as “impos[ing] its regulatory vision on other 
jurisdictions by setting the toughest standards”); see also Editorial, supra note 86 (discussing EU 
antitrust enforcement and calling for “Washington to wake up to Europe’s regulatory imperialism”). 
193  Lawrence A. Kogan, Exporting Europe’s Protectionism, NAT’L INT., Fall 2004, at 91, 99. The 
quoted passage relates to Kogan’s discussion of the EU’s GMO ban and the impact of that ban on 
developing countries in particular. See also Peter F. Drucker, Trading Places, NAT’L INT., Spring 2005, 
at 101 (arguing that one of the purposes of economic blocs—like the EU—is to export their regulations 
for protectionist purposes). 
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pursue global influence.194 In its 2007 policy paper, A Single Market for 
Citizens, the European Commission envisioned the EU and its internal 
market to be standard-setters at the international level: 
[The EU] has spurred the development of rules and standards in areas such as 
product safety, the environment, securities and corporate governance which 
inspire global standard setting. It gives the EU the potential to shape global 
norms and to ensure that fair rules are applied to worldwide trade and 
investment. The single market of the future should be the launch pad of an 
ambitious global agenda.195 
In describing its global role, the EU legitimizes its strategies by 
claiming that its values and policies are normatively desirable and 
universally applicable.196 Seen in this light, the EU’s externalization of its 
regulatory preferences reflects altruistic purposes of a benign hegemon. As 
a champion of norms that serve global welfare, the EU wants to create a 
 
194  According to polls, 70% of Europeans want Europe to assume this role. See Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, European Comm’r for External Relations & European Neighbourhood Pol’y, Speech at 
George Bush Presidential Library Foundation and Texas A&M University EU Center of Excellence: 
The European Union: A Global Power? (Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/530&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage 
=en; see also EUROPEAN COMM’N, TAKING EUROPE TO THE WORLD 59 (2004) (emphasizing as a 
significant achievement Europe’s new and growing world influence); Alasdair R. Young & John 
Peterson, The EU and the New Trade Politics, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NEW TRADE POLITICS 
1, 2 (John Peterson & Alasdair R. Young eds., 2007) (“[B]ecause its economy is important to other 
actors, the EU seeks to wield influence by making access to its large and valuable market conditional on 
domestic policy changes elsewhere . . . .”). 
195  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Single Market for Citizens, at 7, 
COM (2007) 60 final (Feb. 21, 2007); see also Reducing Emissions from the Aviation Sector, EUR. 
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 13, 
2012) (noting that the EU Emissions Trading System is “a step towards global action to mitigate the 
climate impacts of aviation”). 
196  See TFEU art. 3(5) (“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote 
its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, 
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free 
and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the 
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rule-based world and offer an alternative to the more controversial and self-
serving worldview advanced by the United States. A commitment to a 
social welfare state and a cautious attitude towards risk guides the EU’s 
global agenda and steers it towards extensive regulation of the global 
economy—the protection of the environment, health care, precaution in the 
field of biotechnology, and various welfare rights. By emphasizing the 
universal benefits of its global regulatory agenda, the EU often succeeds in 
obscuring the de facto unilateralism that drives its implementation. 
The EU’s active role in the fight against climate change presents one 
example of regulation that is presumably driven by largely benevolent 
motives. Climate change is a global problem that requires a global response. 
The EU has a limited capacity to mitigate climate change alone if other 
states continue to emit greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. The EU has 
led efforts to conclude a new and more potent global climate change 
treaty.197 Yet the difficulties associated with international treaty negotiations 
have given the EU the imperative to act unilaterally.198 The EU’s defense of 
its unilateral regulation is that it is acting in the collective interest to provide 
a global public good: mitigation of climate change.199 
The EU also emphasizes the strong democratic backing for its 
regulatory stance. The European Commission has described the EU’s 
commitment to further its social agenda as part of its trade policy as 
“forging collective preferences”—cultivating the idea that the EU is indeed 
concerned about the social effects of economic integration and justifying its 
measures against foreign entrants as legitimate policies reflecting social 
choices made collectively by Europeans.200 
The EU’s own experience in creating a common market reinforces the 
EU’s pursuit of a global order based on predictable rules. In forming the 
EU, the member states retained their sovereignty. The only way to bind 
them to the common European enterprise was to have them adhere to 
common rules designed to create an internal market.201 More regulation 
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meant more predictability and stability. This has fostered a belief that an 
extensive regulatory system is needed to preserve global public goods. The 
EU takes the view that trade liberalization without simultaneous 
harmonization of policies fails. This, for the EU, offers the most efficient 
and universally valid model of economic and political integration.202 
Yet even if the EU were able to portray itself as a benevolent, 
normative power that is advancing universal norms,203 skeptics point out 
that the notion of a normative power has neo-colonial undertones as the EU 
is exporting its “standards of civilization.”204 In the end, any entity that is 
willing to shape the international order—whether for self-serving or more 
altruistic motives—must do so with the means available to it. In the case of 
the EU, regulatory power is all it has. Lacking traditional means of power, 
the EU’s greatest global influence is accomplished through the norms that it 
has the competence to promulgate. In the absence of military power or 
unconstrained economic power, the EU can exercise genuine unilateral 
power only by fixing the standards of behavior for the rest of the world.205 
B. Internal Motivations 
For those skeptical of the EU’s benevolent motives, the EU is simply 
seeking to level the playing field by exporting its costly regulations abroad 
under the guise of concern for consumer and environmental health and 
safety.206 According to the Czech president Václav Klaus, “[t]he claims for 
quasi-universal social rights are disguised attempts to protect high-cost 
producers in highly regulated countries, with unsustainable welfare 
standards, against cheaper labor in less productive countries.”207 
A concern for EU corporations’ competitiveness offers a compelling 
explanation for the EU’s global regulatory agenda.208 Europe is committed 
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to the welfare state and the sustainability of its economic policies. Yet the 
failure to export its standards to others would put European firms at a 
competitive disadvantage.209 By acting as a global regulator, the EU can 
defend its social preferences without compromising the competitiveness of 
its industries. The worry about EU airlines’ competitiveness was explicitly 
included as a rationale to include foreign airlines into the EU’s emissions 
trading scheme.210 If foreign companies adhere to EU norms on the 
European market, the import-competing industries are assured a level 
playing field. If the EU’s norms further spread to third countries, the EU 
can ensure that its export-oriented firms are not disadvantaged in those 
markets. This account of the EU’s motivations is particularly persuasive 
when one focuses on the private interests as drivers of the EU’s regulatory 
policies and assumes that regulators are responsive to these interests. 
In fact, the Brussels Effect can be seen as a way to level the playing 
field at two levels. First, a group of individual EU member states advocates 
EU-level legislation to ensure that their higher domestic standard does not 
prevent them from competing with corporations subject to lower standards 
in other EU member states. For instance, Germany, the Netherlands, and the 
Nordic countries were the pioneers of the EU’s environmental regulation.211 
Similarly, regulators in France and Germany were some of the key member 
states who exported their privacy regulation upward within the EU.212 These 
countries leveraged their regulations at the EU level by calling for 
harmonized, community-wide standards. Thus, the regulatory preferences 
of a small number of EU member states first become entrenched in EU 
legislation, after which the Brussels Effect can transmit them to third 
countries. 
The push for externalization of EU standards is also reinforced by a 
peculiar constellation of domestic politics, whereby environmentalists or 
consumer advocates and corporations join forces in lobbying for the 
globalization of EU standards. While often in disagreement, both 
environmentalists and corporate interests benefit from the EU imposing its 
standards on foreign firms. Environmentalists gain broader adherence to 
norms that they support—many of which have an inherently global 
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character. At the same time, EU corporations gain a level playing field 
whereby foreign firms do not gain a competitive advantage at their 
expense.213 One example of such an alliance was a coalition between EU 
corporations and environmental groups regarding the EU’s Eco-
Management and Auditing Scheme (EMAS), which regulates public 
disclosure of corporations’ environmental improvement record.214 Already 
subject to the disclosure obligations, the EU corporations teamed up with 
environmental NGOs to lobby for the adoption of the same standards by 
U.S. and Asian corporations. In the end, the campaign was successful and 
the European standards were converted into global standards by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO).215 Thus, the EU has a 
particularly powerful incentive to act externally when the moral and 
economic imperatives of the community coincide—when it enjoys political 
rents from EU industry and the consumer and environmental advocates at 
the same time.216 
It seems evident that the EU is concerned about its corporations’ 
competitiveness and eager to respond to strong domestic pressures calling 
for the globalization of its standards. Yet the EU’s external influence can 
also be viewed as an accidental byproduct of its internal motivations. The 
supranational regulatory apparatus was created to establish and oversee an 
integrated, liberalized, and competitive market in Europe. This institutional 
capacity was a response to internal challenges driven by a political agenda 
that was inward-looking.217 Inconsistent domestic regulations were seen to 
threaten the single market, prompting the need for harmonization. The 
importance of preserving the single market has also driven various 
regulations that do not directly serve the goals of economic integration. For 
instance, the EU’s expanded regulatory authority in consumer and 
environmental matters was created to reassure the European public that 
economic integration would not be pursued at the expense of consumer and 
environmental protection. Rather than aiming to provide global 
environmental standards, the EU was thus concerned with the legitimacy of 
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the single market program.218 Acknowledging the primacy of these internal 
motivations also suggests that the EU’s external influence is not 
compromised during times when it is turned inwards—the external power 
flows directly from the EU’s pursuit of its internal goals. 
While the primary objective of European regulatory activity has been 
to create and guard the single market, this activity has had the ancillary 
effect of establishing the EU as a global regulatory hegemon. This external 
dimension of the single market was only fully realized when the EU’s 
trading partners expressed concerns that the single market might impose 
costs on third countries.219 Of course, the EU—in particular its institutions 
representing the Community interest on the world stage—benefits from 
such “incidental externalities” that follow from the EU’s pursuit of the 
Community’s internal regulatory agenda. These actors likely welcome the 
EU’s newfound external regulatory power, however unintended its origin. It 
is also plausible that the EU’s internal goals are gradually giving way to a 
more multifaceted set of goals—both internal and external—that the EU 
pursues in setting its regulatory policy today. Still, it is the internal goals 
relating to the need to harmonize regulations within the EU that provide the 
most powerful explanation for the origins of, and the motivations for, the 
Brussels Effect. 
Finally, the EU’s external regulatory power can be as much a reflection 
of the bureaucratic interests of the European Commission as it is the 
economic interests of Europe as a whole. The European Commission is the 
executive arm of the EU. Through extensive use of its regulatory powers, 
the Commission compensates for the lack of power it otherwise has in 
external affairs. The Commission’s legal competence to act on its member 
states’ behalf in foreign policy or security-related matters is limited and 
subject to unanimity among the member states.220 On issues relating to the 
single market, the EU’s legal authority is at its broadest. For instance, 
imposing economic sanctions requires a unanimous decision in the 
European Council, which subjects such a decision to a veto by any of the 
twenty-seven member states.221 In contrast, the Commission has been 
delegated the power to take all measures necessary to create and maintain 
the single market.222 
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Expanding the Commission’s regulatory authority also involves low 
costs. Regulations are not constrained by budgetary appropriations and are 
hence not dependent on the tax revenues available to the Community 
institutions. This is significant given that the EU’s budget amounts to only 
around 1% of the GDP of the EU.223 This gives the Commission limited 
options to pursue policies that involve direct budgetary expenditures. The 
EU does not have the funds to provide significant public goods or services 
or finance a large-scale industrial or innovation policy at the Community 
level. Thus, the only way for the Commission to exert influence without 
extensive financial resources is to engage in regulatory activity. The cost of 
complying with these regulations is primarily borne by firms and 
individuals as targets of the EU regulations. And the costs involved in 
implementing and enforcing regulations often fall on the governments of 
the individual member states. Historically, vesting the Commission with so 
much regulatory power might have been unintentional: the EU member 
states wanted to restrict the powers of the Commission through tight 
budgetary discipline. Yet in the absence of traditional powers of states to 
tax and spend (not to mention wage a war), the Commission has built an 
empire of laws and regulations.224 
IV. MARKET-DRIVEN VERSUS POLITICAL HARMONIZATION 
The above discussion has focused on the conditions under which the 
Brussels Effect generates global standards and the factors that cause the EU 
to externalize its regulations through this process. However, unilateralism is 
not the exclusive path for global standards. There are different paths to 
regulatory convergence, all of which operate in parallel. International 
institutions and standard-setting organizations as well as transgovernmental 
standard-setting bodies play a prominent role in promulgating global 
standards.225 In addition, individual firms (or consortia of firms within an 
industry) may become sources of global standards.226 Similarly, the Brussels 
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Effect is not the sole manifestation of the EU’s global regulatory influence. 
The EU also exports its standards through bilateral agreements—most 
glaringly, though accession agreements and partnership treaties.227 At times, 
EU rules diffuse more informally and lead to legislative borrowing through 
various benchmarking mechanisms.228 
This Part compares and contrasts two identifiable avenues for 
regulatory globalization: political harmonization and market-driven 
harmonization. Via political harmonization, the EU pursues regulatory 
convergence through treaties and institutions. Via market-driven 
harmonization, the EU relies on the unilateral Brussels Effect to spread its 
norms. This Part argues that unilateral, market-driven harmonization has 
distinct advantages over political harmonization for the EU. It then seeks to 
explain why, despite these unambiguous advantages, the EU continues to 
embrace multilateralism and pursue political harmonization in some 
instances. 
A. The Relative Advantages of Unilateralism 
Market-driven harmonization has a distinct advantage over political 
harmonization: it entails low contracting costs and limited enforcement 
costs. In relying on unilateral measures, the EU is not forced to seek the 
consent of other states. Unilateralism avoids the need to overcome 
collective action problems or the need to extend costly transfer payments or 
undertake costly coercive measures towards countries reluctant to join a 
treaty or an institution. The EU can also forgo the uncertainties associated 
with the ratification of treaties by foreign legislators. The EU’s recent 
unsuccessful efforts to further the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations and the 
UN-led process to negotiate a new global climate change treaty reveal the 
difficulties associated with multilateral cooperation.229 These processes have 
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required extensive political capital and diplomatic efforts and yielded few 
results. Instead of engaging in burdensome diplomacy to endorse its 
standards, market-driven harmonization allows the EU to outsource the 
lobbying to foreign firms who often become advocates for higher standards 
in their own home markets after having incurred compliance costs in the 
EU. 
The EU’s unilateral regulatory agenda is more easily implemented as it 
requires the cooperation of foreign corporations willing to trade in its 
market rather than cooperation by foreign sovereigns. A contrast can be 
drawn to the efforts of the SEC and the U.S. State Department to enforce 
U.S. rules on insider trading. These efforts were complicated by the 
reluctance of foreign countries, particularly Switzerland, to cooperate with 
the United States due to their domestic laws on bank secrecy. The United 
States has had to spend extensive political capital to persuade Swiss 
authorities to cooperate. This was considered worth the effort given that 
Swiss banks hold approximately half of the world’s private assets.230 The 
United States’ ability to curtail domestic insider trading would have been 
compromised had it not secured a change in the domestic rules of a foreign 
country. Merely incentivizing foreign corporations operating in the United 
States to cooperate was not sufficient to meet this goal. 
Political harmonization is particularly difficult if states do not agree on 
the benefits of global standards. But multilateral standard-setting is difficult 
even if most states agree on the desirability of uniform standards. States 
often have different views on the optimal standard to which they should 
converge. Different points of convergence entail different distributional 
consequences, making some states prefer one standard over another.231 
Unilateral regulatory globalization solves such coordination problems: the 
most stringent rule becomes the focal point of convergence. A mutual 
understanding that the EU can retain its standards at no cost provides a 
predictable and stable equilibrium. 
Perhaps most importantly, market-driven harmonization provides the 
most efficient form of regulatory globalization because the EU can rely on 
its existing domestic institutions to enforce its regulations. Treaties are 
distinctly difficult and expensive to enforce. When a strict global standard 
is a product of an international treaty, there is no guarantee that the treaty 
will be implemented and enforced. The treaty on the world’s marine 
fisheries is one of the many examples of negotiated global standards that 
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fail to accomplish their goals: the treaty has not been successful in 
addressing the problem of overfishing and propelling sustainable 
management of fishing stocks.232 And this is not an anomaly in the world of 
global standards embedded in difficult-to-enforce treaties. Indeed, some 
commentators have noted that treaties producing “effectively enforced 
international standards are the exception rather than the rule.”233 
B. Reasons for Persisting Multilateralism 
The EU has not abandoned multilateralism in favor of unilateralism in 
all instances. The EU’s persisting, if selective, reliance on multilateral rules 
and institutions may be surprising given the many benefits embedded in 
unilateral globalization. Yet there are certain instances where market-driven 
harmonization is not enough, prompting the EU to seek affirmative 
adoption of regulation by foreign regulators. When above-discussed 
conditions for unilateral harmonization are not present, no Brussels Effect 
takes place—whether de jure or de facto. In these situations, multilateralism 
is often the only path to regulatory globalization. 
The theory underlying the Brussels Effect offers further predictions on 
when the EU is likely to pursue political harmonization. The EU would be 
expected to seek political harmonization in situations where it cares about 
international standards and where the Brussels Effect fails to reach EU 
corporations’ important export markets. In the absence of a level playing 
field, the EU’s export-oriented firms may have difficulties penetrating these 
markets. Thus, when the EU is a net exporter as opposed to a net importer 
of a certain product, the EU is expected to care more about the standard of 
the export market than that of its home market. Further, it is precisely then 
that the Brussels Effect is least likely to automatically ratchet the standard 
up, since net importer countries have a smaller presence in the EU. The EU 
is therefore likely to expend diplomatic efforts to negotiate multilateral 
standards in areas where it is a net exporter and rely on markets in areas 
where it is a net importer. 
The EU may also be motivated to encourage third countries to adopt 
certain standards if its internal regulatory objectives would be compromised 
by more lenient standards elsewhere. This is true when actions of other 
countries produce negative externalities that adversely impact Europe, such 
as when China’s failure to limit its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
directly compromises the EU’s efforts to halt climate change.234 Another 
example would be the EU’s efforts to convince other countries to adopt 
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tough domestic antitrust laws.235 The deterrent effect of the EU’s antitrust 
laws can be compromised if members of a cartel are able to offset high EU 
fines by reaping supracompetitive profits in markets that fail to control their 
collusive practices.236 Foreign standards may also reinforce the desired 
effect of EU standards. For example, when standards are characterized by 
network effects, the benefits relative to the costs of adopting a standard 
increase when several countries have the same standard.237 
The EU may also seek to encourage third countries to adopt its 
standards in cases where it is acting out of a moral imperative. If the EU is 
motivated by a moral quest to change behavior globally—e.g., promote 
human rights—unilateral globalization is rarely sufficient. This is 
particularly likely when the issue is salient to influential domestic political 
groups that seek to export an ideology or moral convictions and when they 
care about establishing standards for universal conduct.238 
Finally, at times the EU may pursue political harmonization even when 
market-driven harmonization is taking place. This may reflect willingness 
to “lock-in” certain EU standards by institutionalizing them.239 This can be a 
shrewd way to preempt a future state of the world where market access will 
be a less effective tool for the EU to exert influence. The EU is also often 
successful in incorporating its standards into international organizations, 
making the benefits of unilateralism over multilateralism less stark. Being a 
construction of intergovernmental cooperation itself, the EU has extensive 
experience in promulgating rules that lend themselves to adoption by 
heterogeneous states. The EU is also skillful in using its institutional 
structure—being a hybrid between state and a federation—to its advantage. 
In international negotiations, it can leverage the negotiating power of 
twenty-seven countries while also using the same number strategically as a 
 
235  Bradford, supra note 231, at 408. 
236  The EU is not the lone aggressive regulator of cartels. The United States takes an equally tough 
stand vis-à-vis collusive practices of firms, more than the EU does. Indeed, the United States has more 
invasive investigatory tools and remedies at its disposal than the EU does, due to more extensive 
discovery rules in the United States and U.S. authorities’ ability to pursue criminal penalties. Third 
countries’ agencies can often free ride on U.S. and EU authorities’ investigations. Yet both agencies can 
see their laws’ deterrent effect diluted if cartels can freely operate in third markets. See, e.g., F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004). 
237  See Vogel & Kagan, supra note 15, at 13. However, these standards are not more likely to spread 
unless the main economic activity is taking place on export markets. 
238  See Macey, supra note 29, at 1369. 
239  The European Commission has stated that “[t]he EU aims at global standard setting by 
promoting the adoption overseas of standards and regulatory approaches based on, or compatible with, 
international and European practices.” Gstöhl, supra note 219, at 19 (emphasis and internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Commission Staff Working Paper: Implementing Policy for External Trade in 
the Fields of Standards and Conformity Assessment: A Tool Box of Instruments, at 8, SEC (2001) 1570 
final (Sept. 28, 2001)); see Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Single 
Market for Citizens, COM (2007) 60 final (Feb. 21, 2007). 
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constraint when portraying itself as an agent whose hands are tied and who 
can therefore only sign onto a set of policies that pass the various domestic 
veto points.240 
Market-driven and political harmonization can also take place in 
sequence. The EU is better able to institutionalize its standard if a limited 
Brussels Effect has already taken place: a set of countries exporting into the 
EU already follow the EU standard, whether de jure or de facto. The EU 
may seek to reinforce this trend by requiring its standards to be adopted as a 
condition for closer economic and political relationships with the EU, 
increasing its sphere of influence within its neighborhood. These 
developments allow the EU to reach a critical mass that tips the balance in 
Europe’s favor in any international efforts to reach an agreement on 
harmonization of certain regulations.241 
V. LIMITS OF THE BRUSSELS EFFECT 
The Brussels Effect is not unlimited. A number of external and internal 
constraints impose boundaries on the EU’s ability to leverage its market 
size and foist its regulatory preferences on other states and market 
participants. This Part discusses the relative ability of markets, the EU’s 
trading partners, and international institutions to constrain the 
“Europeanization” of global economic activity. It concludes that these 
forces and actors have a limited ability to temper the EU’s regulatory 
agenda. Instead, the most powerful constraints come from within the EU 
itself. 
A. External Constraints 
1. Markets.—Conventionally, we think that markets are able to 
punish inefficiently stringent regulators. An economic theory of regulatory 
competition among jurisdictions would suggest that if the EU’s regulatory 
standards are too high, it would lose business and foreign investment to 
jurisdictions with more attractive regulatory environments. But this 
assumption is based on the premise that the targets of the regulation are 
mobile. When a state regulates targets that are inelastic—as is the case in 
the EU’s regulation of consumer markets—markets have a limited ability to 
punish for any regulatory excesses. Consumers are likely to stay in Europe 
and businesses have the choice of either providing them with goods 
 
240  See Sabrina Safrin, The Un-Exceptionalism of U.S. Exceptionalism, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1307, 1324–27 (2008). 
241  In a similar vein, Wirth argues that de facto convergence of regulations and business practices 
increases the likelihood of regulatory consensus and thus paves the way for international harmonization. 
Wirth, supra note 36, at 106; see also Bradford, supra note 231, at 439 (arguing that increased 
convergence may pave the way for an international antitrust agreement, but also noting the declining net 
benefits of such an agreement after de facto harmonization has taken place). 
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conforming to EU standards or forgoing the entire market. They rarely opt 
for the latter. 
However, over time, the EU’s regulatory clout may begin to erode as 
the emerging markets increase in the size and affluence of their consumer 
base. Today, corporations are rarely able to carve out the EU as a market for 
their products and services and divert trade elsewhere. But as demand in 
places like China grows, businesses’ dependence on their access to the EU 
market is diminishing.242 It is difficult to imagine a future state of the world 
where genuinely multinational companies like GE would choose to forgo 
trade in Europe and thus avoid clearing their transactions and conduct with 
the EU’s antitrust authorities. But the opportunities for trading elsewhere 
will increase, reducing the opportunity costs of forgoing the European 
market, at least with respect to some products and activities. China will 
increasingly be in a position to offer an alternative destination for various 
goods if European standards make it too costly for businesses to trade there. 
Still, the growing might of Chinese consumers is an imperfect threat, at 
best, to the near-term ability of the EU to continue on its chosen path. It will 
be a while before China could replace the EU as a source of de facto global 
standards. China’s regulatory capacity and the willingness to elevate the 
protection of consumers and the environment over the pursuit of growth are 
not growing with the speed of its economy. While China has banned a few 
high-profile global mergers,243 it has by no means overtaken the European 
Commission as the most ardent guardian of competitive markets. And while 
China may soon be the largest consumer market, GDP per capita is a better 
prediction of a country’s regulatory propensity than is overall GDP.244 
Affluence and social regulation are often correlated, suggesting that 
domestic demand for high levels of regulation is likely to be weak for some 
time to come.245 By the time China might be able to overtake the EU, the 
EU might already have entrenched its norms in other jurisdictions and 
institutions by changing the way business is conducted in a lasting way. 
2. Other States.—Other states, including the United States, have an 
incentive to constrain the EU. EU policies impose adjustment costs on U.S. 
corporations.246 U.S. consumers also end up paying more for goods when 
 
242  See Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050 
(Goldman Sachs, Global Econ., Paper No. 99, 2003), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-
thinking/brics/brics-reports-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf (predicting rapid growth in emerging economies in the 
coming decades). 
243  For example, Chinese officials rejected Coca-Cola’s attempted acquisition of Huiyuan Juice 
Group for $2.4 billion. See Xinzhu Zhang & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, Chinese Merger Control: Patterns 
and Implications, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 477, 480–81 (2009). 
244  See Vogel & Kagan, supra note 15, at 9. 
245  Id. at 6. 
246  Of course, it is plausible that some corporations benefit from their adherence to strict EU 
standards. Compliance with EU rules may be a way to signal high product quality or commitment to 
high standards of consumer protection. 
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producers are forced to accommodate concerns that U.S. consumers do not 
necessarily share. The United States frequently views the EU’s regulatory 
policies as inefficient and detrimental to its welfare—in addition to being 
countermajoritarian and thus undemocratic. Prompted by the American 
chemicals industry, the U.S. government engaged in extensive efforts to 
block or substantially alter the REACH regulation.247 U.S. reaction to the 
EU’s interventionist antitrust laws has been equally hostile.248 And the 
recent plan to subject foreign airlines to the EU’s ETS system has been 
vehemently opposed by U.S. airlines and the U.S. government, as well as 
other foreign governments.249 
But there is very little that the United States can do to stop the EU from 
regulating its domestic market. In this sense, the Brussels Effect differs 
starkly from the California Effect. California cannot promulgate regulations 
that are inconsistent with the federal laws in the United States absent an 
explicit waiver from the U.S. federal government. But there is nothing akin 
to a doctrine of preemption that constrains the EU’s regulatory powers.250 
When U.S. producers are forced to either comply with higher standards or 
be shut out of the EU market, the United States has four ways to respond: 
(1) choose voluntarily to converge to the EU standard; (2) try to compel the 
EU to change its rules, such as by resorting to diplomacy, suing the EU in 
the WTO, or offering the EU some rewards or threatening the EU with 
sanctions; (3) seek a cooperative solution, such as by pursuing an 
international standard that reflects some combination of U.S. and EU 
preferences; or, finally, (4) choose to do nothing.251 
The most controversial strategy for the United States or any other 
foreign government would be to threaten the EU with sanctions. The EU’s 
decision to include foreign airlines into its ETS scheme, for example, has 
 
247  See H.R. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., 
A SPECIAL INTEREST CASE STUDY: THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, AND 
EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO REGULATE CHEMICALS (2004), available at http://oversight-archive.waxman.
house.gov/documents/20040817125807-75305.pdf. 
248  See Matt Murray et al., Oceans Apart: As Honeywell Deal Goes Awry for GE, Fallout May Be 
Global, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2001, at A1 (discussing how the result of the GE/Honeywell agreement 
might chill merger activity among other US multinationals interested in expanding globally). 
249  See the E.C.J. case discussed by Murray et al., supra note 248; see also Joshua Chaffin & 
Andrew Parker, Blow to US Airlines in the Emissions Fight, FT.COM (Oct. 6, 2011, 1:21 PM), http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/36556726-f005-11e0-bc9d-00144feab49a.html#axzz2BZQvmThR. The article 
mentions that twenty-one countries have opposed the inclusion of non-EU airlines into the EU’s ETS 
scheme, how there have been several threats of retaliation, and how China has threatened to cancel a 
contract for ten planes made by European manufacturer Airbus. India has similarly threatened with 
retaliation. 
250  For instance, the Bush Administration preempted California’s regulations on GHG emissions. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006). The EPA also denied California’s first application for a preemption 
waiver. See Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, EPA, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal. 
(Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1514_epa-letter.pdf. 
251  See Young, supra note 44, at 458–59. 
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provoked threats that foreign carriers may forgo European Airbus planes in 
favor of competing U.S.-based Boeing planes.252 However, the prospect of a 
trade war is often too costly for the countries themselves to pursue as a 
strategy. In many instances, the proposed trade sanctions would also be 
inconsistent with the countries’ obligations under the WTO. In past 
U.S.‒EU antitrust enforcement conflicts, for instance, the United States 
threatened the EU with trade sanctions unless the EU backed down.253 Yet 
notwithstanding the escalated rhetoric of retaliation, the antitrust 
controversies led the U.S. government to concede that “[w]e have no power 
to change EU law.”254 
A further challenge for the United States is that it often gains nothing 
by defending its standard even if that standard was more efficient. As a less 
stringent regulator, the United States simply becomes obsolete in the fields 
where the de facto Brussels Effect takes place.255 But the United States is 
unlikely to adopt the EU standard as a regular course of action, either. If we 
assume that the existing domestic regulation in the United States is efficient 
in the sense that it maximizes national welfare and reflects domestic 
political equilibrium, any deviation from that standard entails costs. Firms 
need to reorganize their production processes or practices in order to 
comply with another standard.256 Governments incur costs relating to 
legislating and retraining its regulators.257 And most importantly, the United 
States must forgo the efficiencies that its preferred regulation would 
generate. When holding onto its own domestic standards, the United States 
can at least ensure that its standard governs the activity that is domestic in 
nature. And given how large the U.S. market is, this often provides an 
adequate incentive to stick to its preferred regulation domestically absent 
overwhelming lobbying by domestic export-oriented industries to the 
contrary. 
The United States may also find that even in the absence of its ability 
to defend its corporations from the EU’s standards, its vocal criticism of 
those standards leads the EU to critically evaluate and revise some of its 
 
252  Daniel Michaels, Chinese Envoy Urges Airlines to Shun Buying Airbus Planes, WALL ST. J. 
EUR., Mar. 12, 2012, at 21. However, the EU insists it will not back down. See Joshua Chaffin, EU 
Defies Carbon Trade War Threats, FT.COM (Mar. 20, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
10aebc46-72b6-11e1-ae73-00144feab49a.html#axzz263rsQIP5. 
253  See, e.g., Brian Coleman, U.S. May Retaliate if EU Rejects Boeing Merger, WALL ST. J., July 
18, 1997, at A2 (reporting that President Clinton threatened the EU with unilateral trade sanctions or a 
WTO challenge if the EU were to block the deal). 
254  Majoras, supra note 78, at 14. 
255  At times, the United States may therefore concede and adopt the EU standard, in particular if it 
faces domestic demand to do so following any lobbying activity by its own export-oriented companies 
that are already subject to EU rules and that therefore seek to level the playing field domestically. 
256  See Drezner, supra note 23, at 845. 
257  See id. 
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regulations. The United States’ persistent and strongly voiced criticism258 of 
the banned GE/Honeywell transaction led the EU to pursue more 
sophisticated economic analyses in its future merger investigations. Few in 
the United States believe that the uncertain prospect of fostering changes 
through such “feedback effects” that may (or may not) influence some areas 
of the EU’s policy constitutes a satisfactory response to the loss of the 
United States’ regulatory autonomy. Yet the alternative options are limited. 
The somewhat surprising outcome is that the EU’s increasing 
regulatory clout and its impact on U.S. businesses may lead the United 
States to support greater oversight by international institutions. Though 
often skeptical of international institutions’ ability to regulate the markets, 
the United States may come to see international cooperation as an 
opportunity to play a shared, rather than obsolete, role in the regulation of 
global commerce. This might resemble the idea of “preemptive federalism,” 
whereby the United States may seek international regulation as a means to 
prevent the Brussels Effect. Having some influence over regulatory 
standards is better than ceding influence to the EU altogether.259 But this, of 
course, requires that the EU be prepared to forgo unilateralism for 
multilateralism, enhancing the EU’s bargaining power in any such 
negotiations. 
At the same time, foreign states’ responses are complicated by the fact 
that some foreign stakeholders welcome the EU’s extensive regulatory 
activity. For instance, the intensity of U.S. corporations’ opposition to EU 
rules likely depends on whether they are large, export-oriented producers or 
small, non-export-oriented producers.260 If an export-oriented U.S. firm is 
forced to adjust its global production to the (presumably more costly) EU 
standard, the non-export-oriented U.S. firm gains a competitive advantage 
in the firms’ home market (the only market in which the non-exporting firm 
operates). The small non-exporting firm thus welcomes the de facto 
Brussels Effect. However, these firms’ interests are reversed with respect to 
a possible de jure Brussels Effect. An export-oriented U.S. firm often has 
the incentive to advocate the EU standard in its home market after having 
already adjusted to the EU standard. It benefits from leveling the playing 
field in its home market at no additional cost to itself. In contrast, a non-
export-oriented U.S. firm is likely to resist the de jure Brussels Effect as it 
 
258  See, e.g., Majoras, supra note 78. 
259  See Macey, supra note 29, at 1359; Majoras, supra note 78, at 15 (after criticizing the 
GE/Honeywell decision, proposing to pursue greater international cooperation to avoid inconsistent 
decisions in the future); see also Rahim, supra note 164 (discussing how the Air Transport Association 
of America (ATA) is urging global climate action in the wake of the EU’s decision to include foreign 
airlines into its ETS). The ATA endorses a nonbinding international emissions agreement within the 
UN’s International Civil Aviation Organization. 
260  See, e.g., HELEN V. MILNER, RESISTING PROTECTIONISM: GLOBAL INDUSTRIES AND THE 
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1988) (discussing the divergent interests of exporting and non-
exporting firms). 
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benefits from retaining its competitive advantage over the firm conforming 
to the EU standard. Thus, the relative influence of export-oriented and non-
export-oriented firms will impact the United States’ response to the 
Brussels Effect. 
Some progressive states in the United States endorse the EU’s 
leadership, voluntarily choosing to incorporate EU regulations into their 
own state laws.261 Some developing country governments similarly 
welcome the Brussels Effect. The Brussels Effect presents developing 
countries with an opportunity to outsource their regulatory pursuits to a 
more resourceful agency. Developing country antitrust agencies often free 
ride on the EU’s antitrust investigations, benefiting from the global effects 
of the EU’s decision to ban anticompetitive mergers or force firms to 
amend their conduct and products globally. The countries with the desire, 
but limited resources, to provide safer products for their consumers benefit 
from the EU imposing strict standards that affect production patterns 
globally. U.S. consumers who prefer higher levels of consumer protection 
and a civil society that advocates environmental protection often seize on 
EU policies and use them in their attempts to forge change in the United 
States.262 These groups welcome the EU’s unilateralism, hailing the EU as 
the benevolent provider of global public goods in situations where their 
own countries or multilateral cooperation mechanisms fail to provide them. 
Multinational U.S. corporations can also have a mixed reaction to EU 
regulation. When trading across the common market, they benefit from 
facing a single EU standard instead of twenty-seven different national 
standards, even if that standard is higher than the average standard before 
the upward harmonization took place in the EU. This way, EU regulations 
can be seen as coordination devices that reduce complexity and enhance 
predictability. U.S. corporations can also seize business opportunities in 
third markets in situations where the EU bans certain products or 
production methods domestically, but where there is still demand for those 
products in third markets. In these markets where the Brussels Effect has 
failed to take hold, U.S. producers are likely to face less competition from 
EU producers. 
 
261  For California, REACH can be described as having been “both a catalyst and a resource for 
regulatory reform.” Scott, supra note 122, at 898; see also Pohl, supra note 150 (arriving at the same 
conclusion). 
262  See Young, supra note 44, at 474. For instance, while the EU rules on GMO-derived food have 
not led to a regulatory change in the United States, the dispute surrounding the issue has heightened 
domestic debates on potential downsides of biotechnology. Civic interest groups have seized on the 
issue and used it to promote regulatory change domestically. Similarly, some American consumers are 
content that web operators cannot place cookies—software files that track consumers’ Internet searches 
to gather marketing information—on personal computers. See Pohl, supra note 150; Scott, supra note 
122, at 920–28 (discussing how U.S.-based NGOs, including the Environmental Defense Fund, have 
used REACH to advocate for domestic reform); Editorial, supra note 3. 
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Finally, the EU provides a forum for U.S. producers to challenge their 
competitors’ practices. REACH allows interested parties to submit 
proposals to restrict the use of certain chemicals. This allows any producer 
of chemicals, including a U.S. company, to seek denial of its competitors’ 
(including domestic competitors) substances in the EU.263 In the antitrust 
realm, U.S. corporations have found the EU a valuable legal battleground 
and frequently engage in forum shopping when they seek to halt practices 
of their (often domestic) competitors. U.S.-based United Technologies was 
the principal complainant in the GE/Honeywell merger investigation after 
having lost its acquisition bid to GE. It was also a U.S. company that 
brought charges against Microsoft in the EU,264 knowing that it was more 
likely to obtain remedies in the EU, which harbors a broader notion of what 
constitutes anticompetitive conduct. As the tables turned, Microsoft lodged 
an antitrust complaint before the European Commission against Google.265 
Whether these foreign stakeholders embrace or oppose the Brussels 
Effect, they have the incentive to invest considerable resources in trying to 
influence regulatory outcomes in the EU. Indeed, given the global reach of 
the EU’s regulatory actions, lobbying activity is likely to be particularly 
salient in Brussels as the benefits available from the possible regulatory 
capture of the Commission or another EU institution is expected to exceed 
the benefits of successfully influencing any other regulatory agency with 
lesser global clout. 
3. International Institutions.—At times, international institutions 
have provided the most effective venue to challenge the EU regulations. 
The WTO law prevents countries from restricting imports from countries 
with less stringent regulations unless the importing country can provide a 
scientific justification for the restriction or if the restriction is necessary to 
protect public health or related to conservation of the environment.266 These 
exceptions are subject to specific conditions to ensure that countries do not 
use them as disguised forms of trade protectionism.267 Much of WTO 
litigation therefore centers on the parties’ disagreement as to whether 
 
263  This is particularly valuable if a chemical company can show that it produces a safer alternative 
compared to its competitor’s “substance of very high concern,” as this would lead to automatic denial of 
the competitor’s substance. See Scott, supra note 122, at 930. 
264  See Commission Decision of 24 May 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792—Microsoft, 2007 O.J. (L 
32) 23. The case was initiated by a U.S.-based corporation, Novell, and later joined by Sun 
Microsystems, another U.S.-based corporation. Commission Decision of 24 March 2004, Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792—Microsoft, paras. 3–4, C (2004) 900 final (Apr. 21, 2004). 
265  See Steve Lohr, Antitrust Cry from Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, at B1; Brad Smith, 
Adding Our Voice to Concerns About Search in Europe, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (Mar. 30, 2011, 
9:00 PM), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2011/03/30/adding-our-voice-to-
concerns-about-search-in-europe.aspx. 
266  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT]. 
267  Id. 
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domestic regulations reflect a legitimate exercise of domestic regulatory 
authority or whether they serve protectionist goals and hence constitute 
impediments for international trade. 
The United States did resort to the WTO in challenging the EU’s 
prohibition on GMO food and hormone-treated beef, eventually winning its 
core claims in both trade disputes.268 The United States claimed that the 
EU’s alleged pursuit of food safety and concern for the health of its 
consumers in reality reflected its desire to protect its farmers from foreign 
competition.269 The EU defended its measures on grounds of genuine 
consumer preferences, which in Europe reflect deep skepticism of GMOs 
and growth-promoting hormones,270 and argued that scientific studies 
supported its health concerns.271 The WTO ruled for the United States, 
urging the EU to lift its import ban of hormone-treated beef and similarly 
approve GMO products without “undue delay.” Most recently, the United 
States has challenged the EU’s import ban of U.S. poultry that is rinsed in 
chlorine—a process which, according to the United States, makes poultry 
safe for consumption.272 These challenges suggest that the WTO should 
indeed impose some limits on the EU’s regulatory pursuits. 
Despite these victories, the WTO offers, at best, imperfect remedies. 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is characterized by weaknesses 
such as nonretroactive damages.273 In addition, the WTO system cannot 
compel a member state to lift its restrictive measures. It can merely 
authorize sanctions against a noncompliant member state.274 For instance, 
the EU has maintained its import ban on hormone-treated beef, preferring to 
endure U.S. retaliation.275 The EU has also repeatedly allowed the deadline 
for implementing the GMO ruling to lapse, while the United States has 
 
268  See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) 
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report]; Panel Report, supra note 185, at 1070–72. 
269  Appellate Body Report, supra note 268, at 28. 
270  See id. at 20–23. 
271  Id. at 7. 
272  See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Files WTO Case Challenging 
EU Restrictions on U.S. Poultry Exports (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/press-releases/2009/january/us-files-wto-case-challenging-eu-restrictions-us-p. 
273  JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 367 
(5th ed. 2008). 
274  Id. 
275  See RENÉE JOHNSON & CHARLES E. HANRAHAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40449, THE U.S.-
EU BEEF HORMONE DISPUTE (2010). The EU has further continued to gather scientific evidence to 
justify its import ban and challenge U.S. retaliation. After another round of WTO litigation and a mixed 
and inconclusive Appellate Body ruling, both the EU’s import ban and the United States’ retaliation 
remain in force. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, WTO’s Appellate Body 
Vindicates Continued U.S. Imposition of Sanctions After the EU Claimed Compliance in the EU–
Hormones Dispute (Oct. 16, 2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document_Library/
Press_Releases/2008/October/asset_upload_file626_15173.pdf. 
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suspended its retaliatory measures in anticipation of settlement or the EU’s 
future compliance.276 The difficulties the United States has faced in 
obtaining the EU’s compliance suggests that the WTO provides even less 
relief for the EU’s weaker trading partners. Authorizing a small developing 
country to punish its powerful trading partner hardly guarantees that this 
right will be used. Thus, retaliation rarely provides an effective remedy 
outside of attempts by powerful countries, such as the partially successful 
United States, to constrain the EU. 
The WTO’s ability to constrain individual countries’ regulations is 
further limited by its restricted mandate. The WTO bans discrimination 
between importers and domestic producers.277 Yet many of the EU 
regulations, while perhaps costly to foreign producers, are not 
discriminatory in their nature: EU companies are subject to the same rules. 
If the EU regulations have no disparate impact on foreign producers, 
allegations of protectionism are difficult to maintain. The WTO can do little 
to restrain such regulations that are costly yet not protectionist in their 
object or effect. Further, many areas—such as antitrust and privacy—do not 
fall within the purview of the WTO rules and its dispute settlement 
mechanism in the first place.278 There have been several attempts to include 
antitrust, among other new issue areas, under the WTO framework. All 
those attempts have failed.279 And expanding the scope of the WTO to new 
issue areas is even more unlikely today, as the consensus among over 150 
countries that rarely agree on the content of the rules is increasingly beyond 
reach. 
Indeed, the WTO does not only fail to adequately constrain the 
Brussels Effect; at times, it may even help to facilitate it. The WTO rules 
limit the ability of the EU’s trading partners to respond to EU regulatory 
pursuits with unilateral retaliation.280 Had the United States, for instance, 
imposed trade sanctions on the EU when faced with the EU’s data transfer 
ban, it would have violated the WTO rules and subjected itself to a WTO 
complaint by the EU. In this sense, the WTO can also provide a shield for, 
and not only a limitation to, the Brussels Effect.281 
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authorizes states to restrict trade to “protection of the privacy of individuals.” See Shaffer, supra note 
96, at 50 (quoting GATT, supra note 266, art. XIV). 
279  See Bradford, supra note 231. 
280  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. 
281  See Shaffer, supra note 96, at 54–55. 
107:1 (2012) The Brussels Effect 
 57 
B. Internal Constraints 
The above discussion shows that the ability of other states or 
international institutions to constrain the EU’s regulatory power is limited. 
Instead, the greatest check on the EU’s regulatory power comes from within 
the EU itself. The discussion on the precise conditions required for the 
Brussels Effect to take place sets important limits on the EU’s 
unilateralism. The growing diversity and discord within the EU will further 
constrain the EU’s ability to promulgate new laws that could be 
externalized—whether unilaterally or though political harmonization. Thus, 
in as much as the emergence of the EU’s external regulatory agenda was a 
product of its internal ambitions, the limits to its external influence are 
similarly set by its internal agenda. 
1. The Missing Conditions for Unilateral Regulatory 
Globalization.—The preconditions for unilateral regulatory 
globalization outlined above set important limits to the scope of the 
Brussels Effect. Insufficient market power sets boundaries on the EU’s 
global regulatory clout. For instance, the EU’s attempts to deny market 
access to fish caught unsustainably has not triggered a Brussels Effect since 
exporters have been able to sell their catch in other markets.282 The EU’s 
limited market power with respect to GMOs was discussed above when 
explaining why the Brussels Effect has been incomplete. The EU has been 
even less effective in externalizing its regulations of automobiles to the 
United States. For instance, the EU’s End-of-Life Vehicles Directive,283 
which regulates recyclable components and toxic heavy metals contained in 
automobiles, has had an insignificant impact on U.S. car manufacturers, 
who sell virtually no cars in the EU. At the same time, this directive has 
been successfully externalized on Korean and Japanese manufacturers.284 In 
instances where adjustment costs are high and alternative markets exist, 
producers are likely to forgo the EU market and divert trade elsewhere. 
Further, EU powers derived from market access are limited to 
imposing product standards for goods that are exported to the EU or, for the 
same reason, to prohibiting anticompetitive conduct that has an effect on 
the single market. These regulations can be contrasted with the EU’s failed 
attempts to export its standards for management of hazardous waste. Strict 
standards for waste disposal are costly for domestic producers. Illegal 
transfers of hazardous waste remain common as producers have an 
 
282  See Carr & Scheiber, supra note 232, at 76–79; Kate O’Neill, The Changing Nature of Global 
Hazardous Waste Management: From Brown to Green?, in DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE, 
supra note 15, at 156, 156–58. However, the EU’s denial of market access may still affect the global 
market price as the total demand is curtailed and the fish is sold in an alternative market, possibly at a 
lower price. 
283  See Council Directive 2000/53/EC on End-of Life Vehicles, 2000 O.J. (L 53) 1. 
284  See Schapiro, supra note 131, at 14. 
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incentive to evade regulations and find jurisdictions that do not enforce 
waste management standards. Waste is movable and producers gain nothing 
by trying to dump it in Europe. The EU has no leverage over this area 
unless it can monitor these flows and ban products that involve 
unsustainable waste management practices. Regulatory power is much 
harder to project externally when it consists of attempts to unilaterally limit 
exports to third countries versus preventing imports to one’s own market.285 
In some areas, the EU’s market power is altogether irrelevant. First, the 
EU has little leverage over targets of regulation that are not subject to 
market access. Consider human rights, an area in which the EU has both 
regulatory capacity and a strong preference to pursue high levels of 
protection. But the EU has not been particularly successful in exporting its 
human rights norms or democratic values outside of its direct sphere of 
influence, such as countries in North Africa.286 This raises questions about 
the view that the EU’s “normative power” has universal appeal, leading 
countries to adopt the EU’s norms and standards voluntarily. In the end, the 
EU derives its power from its ability to offer conditional access to its 
markets. For example, signing a human rights treaty can be a condition for a 
trade agreement with the EU.287 Enforcing it is another matter. It is much 
easier to deny market access to a product that does not meet EU standards 
or to ban a transaction that has an effect on the EU market than it is for the 
EU to police international practices that involve individuals who never 
enter the European market. 
Second, the EU is sometimes constrained by its limited regulatory 
capacity. The EU only has regulatory competence in any given area if the 
member states have granted it such competence. However, this is a largely 
theoretical limit since the EU has, over the years, acquired extensive 
regulatory capacity in all areas relating to the single market. And these are 
the very regulations that carry the attributes that lend themselves to 
externalization. However, there are important policy areas where EU 
member states have not transferred powers to the EU—including energy 
 
285  See O’Neill, supra note 282, at 156–58. 
286  See Zielonka, Empire by Example, supra note 190, at 478. 
287  The WTO recognizes very limited rights for any country to limit imports based on human rights 
violations in the exporting country. See GATT, supra note 266, art. XX(a), (e) (listing violation of 
“public morals” or the use of “the products of prison labour” as grounds for derogating from free trade). 
In contrast, protection of health and environment are explicitly listed as grounds for departing from 
WTO obligations. The EU has, however, included human rights provisions in its bilateral trade 
agreements and regularly conditions any country’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) status on 
the country’s agreement to ratify international conventions on human rights and subscribe to labor 
standards endorsed by the EU. See also Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How 
Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression, 59 INT’L ORG. 593 (2005) (analyzing 
the relationship between human rights standards in preferred trade agreements and member states’ 
human rights records). 
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policy and corporate taxation—imposing limits on the EU’s external 
influence in these matters. 
The EU also fails to become the source of global standards in areas 
where the regulatory propensity—the preference for high standards—is 
absent. This can be true EU-wide, where all or most member states share a 
preference for low regulation. Often the missing regulatory propensity, 
however, reflects a preference for heterogeneity within the EU. Online 
gambling is an example of an area where harmonization within the EU has 
failed, with the U.K. favoring legalization of online gambling, while 
countries like Germany and France have resisted legalization in an attempt 
to protect their state monopolies on gambling.288 The EU is also divided on 
questions like corporate tax harmonization with countries like Ireland (with 
its 12.5% corporate tax rate) opposing any step towards tax harmonization 
and countries like France (with its 34% corporate tax rate) endorsing 
common rules.289 And when it comes to financial regulation of any kind, the 
U.K.’s opposition is almost guaranteed.290 
The EU’s regulatory clout is also limited in instances where other 
states have a preference for higher standards. At times, the United States 
prefers higher standards than the EU does. For instance, the U.S. standard 
on automotive emissions remains more stringent than the European one 
even today.291 Similarly, the United States’ Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 
(Sarbanes–Oxley), targeted at improving corporate responsibility in the 
post-Enron environment, is widely perceived as establishing the highest 
global standard for corporate governance.292 Another manifestation of the 
United States’ preference for strict financial regulation is the Dodd–Frank 
 
288  Cf. Bach & Newman, supra note 112, at 33–36 (describing the gambling legalization experience 
at the state level in the United States). 
289  See Stephen Castle, Europeans Introduce Corporate Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2011, at 
B5; EU Corporate Tax Plan Deals Blow to Irish, EURACTIV.COM (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.euractiv.
com/euro-finance/eu-corporate-tax-plan-deals-blow-irish-news-503158 (discussing the “Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base” that was recently put forth by the Commission); see also Tax Wars: 
New Versus Old Europe, ECONOMIST, July 24, 2004, at 61. 
290  Tax Wars, supra note 289 (“As they fight to keep corporate-tax rates low, the central Europeans 
can count on strong support from Britain . . . .”). 
291  VOGEL, supra note 59, at 103, 119–20. The relatively less stringent EU standard is explained by 
the EU’s prioritization of fuel efficiency over pollution control in its regulation of automobiles. This has 
led to a greater use of diesel engines within the EU, which, while improving fuel efficiency, produces 
more pollutants. 
292  Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 7201–7266 (2006)). However, while Sarbanes–Oxley is considered to be the highest standard, the 
United States’ regulatory leverage over the EU was somewhat diluted by the EU’s objection to 
subjecting its firms’ auditing to the oversight by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
created by Sarbanes–Oxley. After negotiations, the United States conceded that EU regulators could 
retain authority over auditing questions. The United States also agreed that the EU can use 
international—as opposed to U.S.—accounting standards in the United States. See NEWMAN, supra note 
174, at 146. 
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Act.293 Where the United States opts for strict standards, it can become the 
source of global standards, assuming the conditions for unilateral regulatory 
globalization are met. As the United States’ recent regulatory pursuits have 
predominantly targeted the financial sector, it is less likely they will be 
converted to global standards because of the relative elasticity of capital. 
For instance, it has been debated whether the effect of Sarbanes–Oxley was 
to ratchet up standards worldwide or to cause U.S. stock exchanges to lose 
listings of foreign corporations.294 In any event, it is evident that the EU’s 
ability to set the global rules alone is always contingent on it having a 
preference for the highest rule, which may not always be the case. 
In addition to the situation where the relatively permissive EU standard 
yields to a stricter foreign standard, there may also be situations where one 
country is stricter on one dimension of a regulation and another country 
stricter on another dimension. In instances where the corporations are 
unable to segment the markets, corporations may thus end up adhering to 
even stricter standards than any single regulator would have required. This 
situation would be an even more penetrating version of unilateral regulatory 
globalization, where the global rule would be ratcheted up by a combination 
of the strictest rules provided by different jurisdictions. 
Further, the EU’s leverage is compromised in the case of regulation of 
more elastic targets, such as capital. For instance, in the wake of the Euro 
crises, the EU proposed a tax on financial transactions. This proposed tax 
would cover a broad range of financial transactions between banks and 
other financial institutions, including securities, bonds, currency 
transactions, and derivatives.295 However, the EU knows that the 
introduction of this tax would likely divert trading activity to financial 
centers outside the EU. Unable to unilaterally impose this tax globally, the 
 
293  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, 22, and 26 U.S.C.). Given the current state of 
flux of European financial regulation, it is not clear how the United States and the EU will compare in 
terms of the relative stringency of their banking and other financial regulations. 
294  See, e.g., Bob Sherwood, Long Arm of the US Regulator, FT.COM (Mar. 9, 2005, 6:37 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/1/be157b6a-90c6-11d9-9980-00000e2511c8.html#axzz2CJweoF8T; see 
also John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market 
Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002) (discussing the 
impact of stock exchange “cross-listing” on global regulatory competition in the securities arena). A 
related question is whether the availability of securities class actions in the United States deters foreign 
companies from listing on a U.S. exchange. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM 
REPORT 11 (2006) (“Foreign companies commonly cite the U.S. class action enforcement system as the 
most important reason why they do not want to list in the U.S. market.”). 
295  See Joshua Chaffin et al., Business Lashes Out at Trading Tax Plans, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 
29, 2011, at 1. The tax would apply as long as “one party to the transaction were established in a 
Member State of the EU and that a financial institution established in the territory of the Member State 
concerned was party to the transaction.” Press Release, European Comm’n, Common Rules for a 
Financial Transaction Tax—Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 28, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/640. 
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EU is pursuing political harmonization in the G-20.296 Yet, examples of 
elastic targets can be found outside of capital markets as well. The 
European Court of Justice’s recent denial of the patentability of human cells 
is unlikely to lead to a global standard.297 The critics claim that the EU’s 
stringency only drives stem cell research and business out of the EU, 
highlighting the mobility of the industry.298 
Also, when products do not call for a uniform standard, such as when 
markets are divisible or scale economies are insufficient to justify a uniform 
standard, the EU can at best achieve compliance with its standard, but not 
globalization of those standards. This is true, for example, with respect to 
labor laws that are not characterized by scale economies.299 Another 
example comes from the antitrust domain. In 2007, the EU launched an 
antitrust investigation into whether Microsoft’s practice of offering its 
Windows software with only one Internet browser, the Microsoft-owned 
Internet Explorer, presented antitrust concerns. In response, Microsoft 
presented Windows 7 E, a Europe-only version of Windows that came with 
no Internet browser.300 Several other products are also divisible across the 
markets. Car manufacturers are responding to different national and 
regional emission standards with diversified technologies in an effort to 
minimize risks and maximize returns.301 DVDs offer another example. They 
have different region codes allowing film distributors to segregate release 
dates, content restrictions, and price across regions. Patent protection, 
discussed above, is also divisible: the EU’s ability to impose its rules on the 
patentability of human cells is constrained not only by the mobility of 
research firms but also by the ability of these firms to continue filing 
patents in other jurisdictions. Thus, the Brussels Effect is unlikely whenever 
the firm’s costs of customizing its conduct or production to different rules 
are low. 
 
296  See European Comm’n, supra note 295. The financial transaction tax is an example where the 
other conditions for the Brussels Effect are also missing: the EU currently lacks the regulatory 
competence (or capacity) to impose this tax; the required regulatory propensity is also missing, as the 
U.K. opposes the proposal. There are also alternative markets for trading activity, reducing the EU’s 
leverage. Finally, the tax is also divisible in the sense that all jurisdictions do not have to apply the same 
tax, but instead retain their autonomy to regulate trade in their jurisdictions. 
297  Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV., EUR-Lex 62010CJ0034 (Oct. 18, 2011). 
298  See Scientists Fear Stem Cell Ruling Deals Blow to EU Research, EURACTIV.COM (Oct. 19, 
2011), http://www.euractiv.com/health/scientists-fear-stem-cell-ruling-deals-blow-eu-research-news-
508404. 
299  See supra Part I.E. 
300  See Emil Protalinski, Windows 7 to Be Shipped in Europe Without Internet Explorer, 
ARSTECHNICA (June 11, 2009, 2:57 PM), http://arstechnica.com/microsoft/news/2009/06/windows-7-to-
be-shipped-in-europe-sans-internet-explorer.ars. 
301  See, e.g., KPMG INT’L, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY: THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION EFFECT 16 (2010), available at http://www.kpmg.de/docs/
transformation-automotive-industry.pdf (discussing technology-implementation strategies used by auto 
companies in complying with divergent national regulations). 
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With advances in technology, it is possible that goods will become 
increasingly divisible in the future.302 It is likely to become technologically 
feasible and economically viable to produce a greater range of product 
varieties to serve the different consumer tastes and regulatory requirements 
prevailing in different markets. The acknowledgment of the Brussels Effect 
should further incentivize companies to develop technologies that allow for 
greater divisibility at lower costs. Such a development, to the extent that it 
applies to a significant number of product markets, may gradually erode the 
EU’s ability to exert global regulatory clout in the future. 
2. Internal Conflicts and the Growing Diversity.—Not everyone 
within the EU benefits from its aggressive regulatory stance. EU 
consumers, who value access to cheap imports, may occasionally question 
whether the higher product standard justifies the higher cost products, in 
particular in challenging economic times. Some EU corporations may also 
find that excessively high regulatory standards are unsustainable for the 
European economy. They argue that excessive reliance on the precautionary 
principle may slow economic growth and innovation303 and price EU firms 
out of critical export markets.304 Some companies in the EU might have 
benefited from the unlevel playing field and lax regulations in markets 
where the Brussels Effect has not taken hold. European companies have 
increased their foreign direct investment (FDI) and established themselves 
in third markets from which they import into the EU.305 As a result of 
externalization of the EU standards, they can no longer reap gains from 
lower production costs that drove them to those markets in the first place. In 
addition, European companies whose competitiveness depends on their 
access to cheaper foreign inputs are hurt when those inputs are subjected to 
more burdensome regulations. Since approximately half of international 
trade consists of trade in intermediate goods,306 it is difficult to identify 
exactly who is winning and who is losing when one country is regulating 
multinational corporations with worldwide supply chains. Thus, voices 
within the EU may join those outside to call for reining in the excesses of 
its regulatory accomplishments. 
 
302  See The Third Industrial Revolution, ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 2012, at 15. 
303  See Kogan, supra note 193, at 94; see also Leo Cendrowicz, Is Europe Finally Ready for 
Genetically Modified Foods?, TIME (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/
0,8599,1970471,00.html (discussing the costs to Europe of continued rejection of GMO-derived food 
products). 
304  See Cendrowicz, supra note 303 (noting that the Brussels Effect is expected to be less likely 
when the EU is a net exporter of certain products). These companies take little comfort that the playing 
field in their home market is level. 
305  EVA R. SUNESEN ET AL., COPENHAGEN ECON., IMPACTS OF EU OUTWARD FDI 6 (2010) (“Over 
the last couple of decades, EU firms have increased their investments outside EU borders. Outward FDI 
has increased by a factor of five during the last fifteen years . . . .”). 
306  Sébastien Miroudot et al., Trade in Intermediate Goods and Services 17 (OECD Trade Policy 
Working Paper No. 93, 2009). 
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As the EU’s regulatory powers grow, divisions within the EU also 
grow. It becomes harder for the EU to pass new regulations amidst the 
growing heterogeneity of its population. One salient example is that the EU 
has been unable to create a common energy policy despite the EU member 
states’ collective vulnerability to energy insecurity.307 Enlargement 
magnifies this problem as preferences within the EU become more diverse 
while the EU institutions fail to adjust to more complex decisionmaking. 
There is also great disparity among the EU governments on what the 
EU’s global role ought to be and how it should exercise its power. All other 
powers have internal conflicts, yet the EU’s decisionmaking is always 
subject to two potential veto points: support for any given policy must first 
be garnered at the level of the member states, followed by the EU.308 At the 
same time, the internal constraints have at times been a source of power for 
the EU. Because of the visible internal divisions and resulting constraints in 
its mandate, the EU has been able to obtain more concessions in 
international trade negotiations than it would have had it been able to gain 
approval for trade deals through majority voting.309 In pursuing negotiated 
harmonization, this internal conflict can be a source of strength. But the 
EU’s ability to unilaterally externalize its internal market hinges on its 
ability to first agree on the internal rules capable of being exported. 
Today, the EU faces a distinctive challenge to its authority. The 
concurrent deepening and widening of the EU’s agenda has already created 
severe constitutional crises within the EU, with the difficulties surrounding 
the euro further testing the limits of solidarity within the union. The great 
political divide in Europe today is not between the right and the left but 
between those who are turned inwards and those who embrace globalization 
and further integration. The former would scale back the powers transferred 
to the EU in the name of reinstating the sovereignty of European nations. 
Fearful of these demands, even the integrationists are growing more timid 
in their calls for expanding EU powers at the expense of national 
sovereignty. More European regulation means less sovereignty. And less 
sovereignty means more unpredictability and loss of control akin to the 
crises surrounding the common European currency. Thus, the growing gap 
between these different visions within Europe for Europe in the end 
presents perhaps the greatest challenge to the European external regulatory 
agenda. 
 
307  See Laïdi, supra note 56, at 19. 
308  See Meunier & Nicolaïdis, supra note 49, at 908–09. 
309  See id. at 909; Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 459–60 (1988). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has highlighted the unprecedented global power that the 
EU is exercising through its legal institutions and standards that it 
successfully exports to the rest of the world via the Brussels Effect. Without 
resorting to international institutions or seeking other nations’ cooperation, 
the EU is able to promulgate regulations that become entrenched in the 
legal frameworks of developed and developing markets alike, leading to the 
“Europeanization” of important aspects of global commerce. 
This discussion has been descriptive, intentionally omitting the 
normative inquiry on whether the Brussels Effect is socially desirable. It 
seems evident that corporations are not necessarily adjusting to EU 
standards because of the prospect of mutual gains or some Pareto-
improving outcome. If existing regulations in other jurisdictions are 
optimal, the Brussels Effect is likely to lead to inefficiently high overall 
global regulation, adversely affecting global welfare.310 But the Brussels 
Effects may also lead to an efficient outcome. If existing regulations in 
other jurisdictions are too permissive or weakly enforced, unilateral 
regulatory globalization might be a desirable means of overriding 
suboptimally low regulations elsewhere. The overall welfare effects of this 
phenomenon are thus difficult to disentangle.311 
The Brussels Effect may also raise concerns of democratic 
accountability. The idea that unelected European civil servants have the 
ability to block global transactions by U.S. companies can be disconcerting 
to those involved. However, others might claim that the Brussels Effect 
does not undermine U.S. democracy. The EU’s regulatory reach may have 
the effect of balancing the overrepresentation of business interests in 
American public life by empowering consumers.312 These are some of the 
normative questions that this Article raises but intentionally leaves for 
others. 
The acknowledgement of the existence and influence of the Brussels 
Effect has implications for how we think about power and the question of 
who is powerful and why. If you were to ask national security experts 
whether the EU is powerful, they would probably say no. If you were to ask 
economists whether the EU is powerful, they would probably discuss how 
the relative power of the EU is diminishing with the rise of China. But if 
 
310  We would also need to understand whether the possible costs of excessively strict global 
regulations outweigh the costs of having divergent, even if individually more optimally tailored, national 
regulations. 
311  Similarly, the EU’s unilateralism can be thought to fill the void where collective action problems 
prevent countries from reaching efficient outcomes through treaties. Yet the failure to cooperate 
multilaterally may also be a sign that international agreement would not be welfare-enhancing, raising 
questions about the desirability of the EU providing a global regime alone. 
312  See Robert O. Keohane et al., Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT’L ORG. 1 (2009) 
(discussing how multilateral institutions can enhance domestic constitutional democracy). 
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you were to ask GE, Microsoft, Google, Monsanto, Dow Chemical, or 
Revlon whether the EU is powerful, the answer would be a resounding (and 
likely bitter) yes. 
One key question is what type of power matters today. Much of 
international relations discussion has until the recent past been preoccupied 
by the traditional notion of military power. Yet the utility of military power 
is declining.313 Economic concerns usually prevail over military 
imperatives. The EU is making a conscious choice not to build a powerful 
military—it rather free rides on the United States’ use of it. For instance, 
the EU’s ability to influence central and eastern European countries was 
significantly enhanced by the level of security and stability that existed 
there, thanks to U.S. military power.314 Military free riding allowed the EU 
to devote its resources to other activities instead, including promoting its 
rules and standards in eastern European countries. 
While the currency of international politics is increasingly economic 
power, its possession is difficult to translate into concrete forms of 
influence today. Economic power used to be associated with the United 
States, the EU, and Japan. Today, economic power is more dispersed as 
China and other emerging economies are growing in affluence. In the world 
of multiple powers and heterogeneous interests, exercise of unilateral 
economic power is rarely possible. The inability to conclude the WTO trade 
talks is one reminder that in the world where many are powerful, nobody 
alone is powerful enough to get anything done. Economic sanctions are 
rarely successful today because embargoed nations have an easier time 
finding alternative suppliers or markets for their products. Conditional aid 
and other rewards, traditionally used by powerful nations and institutions 
like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as means of 
leverage, are decreasingly effective as countries like China are prepared to 
extend aid to rogue and needy countries—no strings attached. 
When power is defined in terms of the actual influence that a country 
can wield, the EU’s ability to penetrate vast areas of global commerce is 
relevant. Contrary to traditional contours of influence, the Brussels Effect 
captures a phenomenon where the EU does not have to do anything except 
regulate its own market to exercise global regulatory power. The size and 
attractiveness of its market does the rest. By virtue of being the world’s 
largest trading block, the EU can dictate what is traded. It is one of the few 
areas of influence where unilateralism still works. Regulatory power is a 
less costly, more deployable, and more durable type of power. Also, unlike 
other forms of power, it cannot easily be undermined by others. 
Another advantage of regulatory power is its ability to generate 
leverage that has the greatest impact with the lowest political profile. Many 
 
313  See Gelb, supra note 35. 
314  See Zielonka, Empire by Example, supra note 190, at 482. 
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of the regulations appear technical but often have major implications on 
countries, corporations, and consumers around the world. Conflicts over 
regulatory power rarely elevate to the political level. Trade is a much less 
controversial way of pursuing foreign policy objectives, in particular when 
the EU can always, in principle, offer the choice of not complying with its 
rules. Subscribing to EU rules is the price of trading with Europe. All the 
EU is doing is exercising its right to protect its own consumers. This is a 
less controversial position to take compared to a regime change pursued in 
the name of laudable goals such as democracy or human rights. Thus, in 
falling between coercion and cooperation, regulatory power strikes a 
balance of legitimacy and potency that makes it a more efficacious option 
than its alternatives. 
The EU’s regulatory clout shows that the EU can be a superpower 
without a super state. It is a shrewd and influential actor that projects its 
values and makes the world to its liking by playing to its strengths. While 
the EU portrays itself as a champion of multilateralism, it is selectively 
supporting multilateralism in areas where it lacks unilateral power. The 
more the EU bolsters the authority of the UN Security Council, the more 
the EU can constrain the exercise of unilateral power by the United States. 
But when it comes to the regulation of global markets, the EU can go it 
alone and is hence less concerned about pursuing multilateral institutional 
cooperation. 
The discussion also challenges the primacy of the narrative that the EU 
is a “normative power” that leads by example. The EU is often viewed as a 
power that relies on persuasion to change “hearts and minds” and thereby 
the preferences and identities of other actors. The EU is regularly portrayed 
as a new type of power that steers away from coercion and relies instead on 
positive incentives and soft power.315 This Article has not argued that those 
propensities of influence are not within the EU’s repertoire of influence. 
Yet, this Article has focused on what is a vast, unappreciated, and perhaps 
the most controversial aspect of the EU’s global role: the EU’s unilateral 
employment of tools of soft coercion that go against the preferences of its 
trading partners. 
An understanding of the existence and the full impact of the Brussels 
Effect is likely to influence the perception of the EU by its trading partners. 
But it is also likely to change the perception of the EU within the EU itself. 
Acknowledgment of the EU’s global regulatory power might give pause to 
both the EU’s relentless critics, who emphasize the EU’s weakness and 
irrelevance, as well as to its most ardent defenders, who call for increasing 
integration and a gradual move towards a federation that allows the EU to 
rise to global prominence. For the critics, the discussion has shown that to 
portray the EU as powerless focuses on a narrow and outdated vision of 
 
315  See Hugh Richardson, Head of the Delegation of the European Comm’n to Japan, Speech at 
Waseda University: Smartening the EU’s Soft Power (May 16, 2008) (transcript on file with author). 
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what power and influence mean. For the defenders, the discussion has 
shown that the need to move towards a federation is probably not as 
pressing given the extent to which the EU is already able to advance its 
interests, within and beyond its borders.316 The EU is already a superpower 
and, importantly, a superpower of a meaningful kind. 
 
316  See also LEONARD, supra note 203 (arguing in this spirit). 
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